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Wittgenstein and His Literary ExecutorsChristian Erbacher
Rush Rhees, Georg Henrik von Wright and Elizabeth Anscombe
are well known as the literary executors who made Ludwig
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy available to all interested read-
ers. Their editions of Wittgenstein’s writings have become an
integral part of the modern philosophical canon. However, sur-
prisingly little is known about the circumstances and reasons
that made Wittgenstein choose them to edit and publish his
papers. This essay sheds light on these questions by present-
ing the story of their personal relationships—relationships that,
on the one hand, gave Rhees, von Wright and Anscombe dis-
tinct insights into Wittgenstein’s philosophizing; and, on the
other hand, let Wittgenstein assume that these three former stu-
dents, and later colleagues and friends, were the most capable
of preparing his work for publication. Using hitherto unpub-
lished archival material as well as information from published
recollections, the essay sketches the development of the per-
sonal and philosophical bonds from which the literary heirs’
distinct ways of handling Wittgenstein’s unpublished writings
grew in later years.
Wittgenstein and His Literary Executors
Rush Rhees, Georg Henrik von Wright and Elizabeth




Born in Rochester, New York in 1905, Rhees was the oldest of
the three literary executors and the one who knew Wittgenstein
the longest. He arrived at Cambridge in 1933 and soon began
attending Wittgenstein’s lectures. However, by this time the 28
year old Rhees was no longer an undergraduate and had al-
ready begun his philosophical life-journey.
At the age of 17, Rhees had begun studying philosophy at
the University of Rochester. Though he had an outstanding
position as the son of the president of that University, Rhees
would not allow that his freedom of speech was restricted—
quite the contrary. For example, Dr. George Mather Forbes—a
distinguished professor of philosophy, head of the department
of education and creator of the department of psychology at the
University of Rochester—expelled Rhees from his ethics course
because he would not comply with his teacher’s doctrines. This
revolt against institutional authority aroused the attention of
the press and was even reported by The New York Times in a
front-page story:
Young Rhees said the professor’s action was a “blessing”. “I am a
radical. Dr. Forbes is not. That is why I am barred from the course.
. . . An anarchist does not believe in law. Nor do I. Therefore I say
that law is directly opposed to any notion of ethics. Law is a sys-
tem of compulsion and does away with any individual decision.”1
Uncompromising advocacy for individual freedom had a tradi-
tion in the Rhees family. One of Rhees’ ancestors, Morgan John
Rhys, was a Welsh preacher who wrote pamphlets agitating for
the ideas of the French Revolution.2 In 1793, Rhys moved to
Paris to experience the outcomes of the revolution firsthand, but
he was prosecuted under the reign of terror. To save himself,
he fled to America where he founded a colony for Welsh emi-
grants. In this mission, Morgan John Rhees (as he spelled his
surname after emigration) was supported by Benjamin Rush,
signatory of the Declaration of Independence. Expressing his
gratitude to Rush, Morgan Rhees named his son after him. Ever
since, the Christian name “Rush” has been passed down from
generation to generation. The Rush Rhees of our story not only
continued the fight for freedom in the first Rush’s name, he had
also inherited the passion for defending his views with radical
statements; and as with his distinguished ancestors, Rhees was
prepared to act. Only 19 years old, Rhees left the land of his
forefathers and went off to study philosophy in Europe.
“Wearing his shirt collar loose & open at the neck” (von
Hugel 1981, 275–76, quoted in Phillips 2006, 268), Rhees ap-
peared like a young Percy Shelley to Professor Norman Kemp
Smith when he arrived in Edinburgh in 1924. Kemp Smith, a
Scotsman, had been professor of psychology and philosophy
at the University of Princeton when he published an exten-
sive Commentary to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (Kemp Smith
1“Radicalism of Rochester President’s Son Causes Professor to Bar Youth
From Class”, Special to The New York Times, 28 February 1924, p. 1. The pre-
ceding passage in the article reads: “’The most unsatisfactory notebook for
the year’s work I have ever had turned in to me.’ Dr. Forbes told his class of
seventy-five students, referring to young Rhees’s work. ‘It attempted refuta-
tion of everything I had taught during the year’.”
2Most of the biographical information in the following three paragraphs
can be found in Phillips (2006).
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1918). In 1924, Kemp Smith was professor of logic and meta-
physics at the University of Edinburgh and would soon pre-
pare his epoch-making translation of Kant’s first Critique (Kant
1929). At the beginning of Rhees’ years of study, Kemp Smith
understood that Rhees aspired to be a poet and mainly sought
inspiration from philosophy (Phillips 2006, 268). However, he
convinced the strong-headed youth that he could only achieve
any of his high ambitions through disciplined work. Under the
guidance of this thoughtful and strict teacher, Rhees, after four
years, graduated from the University of Edinburgh with high
honors. That same year, 1928, he was given a post as lecturer at
the University of Manchester, where he distinguished himself
through his “wholehearted commitment in teaching” (Phillips
2006, 268).3
When the post as lecturer at the University of Manchester
expired after four years, Rhees took this as an opportunity
to pursue philosophical research. In 1932 he moved to Inns-
bruck, Austria, in order to study the philosophy of Franz
Brentano with Professor Alfred Kastil. Kastil, a former stu-
dent of Brentano, had been appointed editor of Brentano’s un-
published writings some 15 years earlier. While Rhees was in
Innsbruck, Kastil edited the Kategorienlehre for Brentano’s com-
plete works (Brentano 1968). This book contained Brentano’s
theory of the continuum. Rhees developed a keen interest in
Brentano’s treatment of continuity as a perceptual phenomenon
and of the relation between continuous phenomena and their
parts (Körner and Chisholm 2010). Kastil was impressed by
Rhees’ philosophical vigour and he believed that Rhees could
elaborate on Brentano’s theory:
Brentano struggled with the difficulties of the continuum repeat-
edly throughout his life and developed a general theory of con-
tinuity, which sets forth the general laws for continua of various
3The qualification stems from a recommendation written by Rhees’ supe-
rior, professor J. L. Stocks, at the University of Manchester.
numbers of dimensions. In this connection he did not neglect the
peculiarities which distinguish topic continua from chronic con-
tinua. But Brentano devoted special study to double continua,
of which motion is the most important example. Here he devel-
oped the conceptions of teleiosis and of plerosis, the former of
which applies to differences of velocity, the latter to the quanti-
tative differences in the connections of boundaries. But even in
regard to these relations of continuity Brentano’s theory remains
incomplete; indeed he indicated to me a few days before his death
that his theory was in a process of alteration, without giving any
further indication of the kind of improvements which he had in
mind. It now appears very probable that Mr Rhees’s acumen and
unsparing diligence have succeded [sic] in finding the proper ap-
proach here.4
Since Brentano built on Aristotle’s doctrine of relations, Kant-
scholars accused him of scholasticism. In turn, it was Brentano’s
intention to target their jargon with his philosophy (Brentano
1968, XXVIII). Thus, key features of Brentano’s work—namely,
the thorough criticism of scholarly jargon and the firm convic-
tion that psychology and philosophy ought to be conducted like
the sciences—made him a congenial thinker to the movement
of analytical philosophy in England. It is therefore no wonder
that after working for one year on Brentano’s theories of rela-
tions and continuity, Rhees was accepted as a doctoral student
at Cambridge. In 1933, George Edward Moore became his su-
pervisor.
Moore had been Wittgenstein’s friend and one of his closest
discussion partners since Wittgenstein’s years of study at Cam-
bridge before World War I; he had visited Wittgenstein in Nor-
way in the Spring of 1913, taking dictations from the student
he believed to be already a most significant philosopher. Af-
ter Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge in 1929, the professor
4Letter of recommendation, Easter 1935, Richard Burton Archives (here-
after abbreviated RBA), UNI/SU/PC/1/1/2/3. See also Erbacher and
Schirmer (2016).
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became an attendee of Wittgenstein’s lectures. When Rhees ar-
rived at Cambridge in 1933, Moore therefore recommended that
he also attend Wittgenstein’s lectures. By this time Wittgenstein
had already worked through at least one major phase of his new
philosophy: he had departed from the conception of analysis
presented in the Tractatus, he had identified misleading ideas in
his youth work and developed a method to clarify them, and
he had just given a summarizing compilation of his new writ-
ings to a typist.5 Around the time of Rhees’ arrival at Cam-
bridge, Wittgenstein was trying out new formats for presenting
his views in a book. He was collaborating with Friedrich Wais-
mann, a member of the Vienna Circle who wanted to give a sys-
tematic account of Wittgenstein’s new philosophy, and he was
dictating another draft to selected students.6
Amongst the Cambridge freshmen, Wittgenstein had become
an almost mystical figure, famous, in any case, as an uncon-
ventional and eccentric teacher. Many students imitated his
gestures and phrases when following him through Whewell’s
Court on their way to the lectures.7 Rhees was put off by those
acolytes (Monk 1991, 357), but for his supervisor’s sake he ap-
proached Wittgenstein and received a probing reply:
When I Rhees asked him [Wittgenstein] first if I could come to
his lectures, he asked if I had any idea of what went on in them.
And when I said (or said something like) obviously I had only
such ideas as came from discussion with those attending them,
Wittgenstein said: “Suppose you asked someone ‘Can you play
the violin?’, and he said: ‘I don’t know, but I can try.’”8
5Editions of a major step in this development have appeared as Wittgen-
stein (1969b) and Wittgenstein (2000a).
6Waismann’s account was published in Waismann (1976); Wittgenstein’s
dictation was published in Wittgenstein (1958).
7From notes of a personal conversation with Sir John Bradfield.
8Letter from Rhees to von Wright, 22 January 1976, von Wright and
Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Helsinki (hereafter abbreviated
WWA).
On reflection, this puzzling response may be understood as a
grammatical joke, showing the kind of philosophical investi-
gation that took place in Wittgenstein’s lectures.9 However,
Rhees was not taken with the philosophizing that he witnessed
in Wittgenstein’s class, as he told his Austrian mentor Kastil in
a letter:
I went to Wittgenstein a few times. He very much gives me the im-
pression of being a straightforward and honest person; however,
I don’t think that I will go to him more often. I did not make
this decision instantly, as Moore seems to be very appreciative
of Wittgenstein. I, in turn, value Moore’s judgment very highly,
and I know that he would not have his opinion without a reason.
Nonetheless, I think I will not go anymore. I find his style of lectur-
ing confusing. He never prepares—and when he does, his lectures
suffer. (I am convinced that he is no posturer in this, although he
is probably mistaken.) He continuously speaks in similes (which
are only partly actual examples), and says about himself that he
always thinks in similes. If something does not become clear, he
does not try to give an explanation in simple words but instead
looks for a new simile. This method, though, is in accordance with
his philosophical position, according to which the answers to the
most important philosophical questions cannot be given through
propositions or theories, but can only be “shown” by means of sim-
iles or “symbolic forms”. Therefore, he says that he may be the
right man for philosophy. (This is again, I believe, only naivety,
not a sign of vanity.) But this is why his lectures do not get show a
clear thread. Currently he lectures on the philosophy of language,
particularly on the idea of meaning. He constantly emphasizes
that the matter is exceptionally difficult. Sometimes he grabs his
head, giving the explanation, “All this is tremendously difficult, we
are in the middle of hell right now.” And I asked myself if some
of the attendees have any clear impression about philosophy, bar-
ring that the whole (quite undefined) matter is “tremendously dif-
ficult”. This I regard as pedagogically bad. I hear that only after
having heard him for a fairly long time one starts to recognize how
much one gets from him. That I am willing to believe. But life is
9I am thankful to James Conant for this suggestion.
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short; and the question is whether I would not profit even more
if I used the time for something else (e.g. for the study of Marty’s
works). And at the moment, it seems to me that this question has
to be answered in the affirmative.”10
Wittgenstein himself was not satisfied with these lectures
that were unusually crowded with 30–40 people (Wittgenstein
2003a, 345). In fact, soon after Rhees had written the above let-
ter, Wittgenstein announced that he couldn’t continue to lecture
and proposed that selected students should write down dicta-
tions that could then be distributed (Wittgenstein 2003a, 345).
Though Rhees continued to attend Wittgenstein’s lectures
during the subsequent terms (Wittgenstein 2003a, 346–47), he
remained critical towards the philosophy he was confronted
with at Cambridge. As a participant in lectures, he would not
merely sit and listen, but pose challenging questions (Rhees
2006, XXV). Still in 1935, Rhees firmly held on to the views he
had acquired in Austria, as the following letter to Kastil shows:
My work here doesn’t go particularly well. You have no idea
which entanglement of fictions people here believe in; which dif-
ferent “meanings” of “is” and “exists”. These are not regarded as
homonymia pros hen (if people know what that means?), but, ap-
parently, as homonymia apo tuches. They indeed are supposed
to be different forms of existence, but without having anything
in common. And no matter to what extent one thinks to have
uncovered such doctrines, new objections come from unexpected
quarters—also based on different “meanings”. In the course of one
argument, I remarked that the apodictic “is impossible” includes
an empiric “is not”. Moore wanted to deny this and told me that
Wittgenstein holds this opinion as well. He admits that if a round
quadrangle is impossible, there is no round quadrangle. But, ac-
cording to him, the latter must mean something different than the
10Letter from Rhees to Kastil, 5 November 1933, Franz Brentano Archiv
at the University of Graz, inventory number 000616–000622; original in Ger-
man, translation by Tina Schirmer and Christian Erbacher. Underlinings in
the original letter are transcribed as italics. A new edition of Moore’s lecture
notes of these lectures has appeared as Wittgenstein (2016).
“there is no —” as in “there is no green human being”. The dis-
cussion about this point went on for quite a long time. Yet I still
can’t see what he suggests. His argument seems to mainly rest
on the idea that I cannot learn through experience that no round
quadrangle exists; therefore, the “is” or the “exists” must have a
different meaning. If it is readily clear that we cannot learn it by
experience? And if so, how does this give a different meaning to
the “is”? Yes, Moore says, as it shows that the truth or the fact that
is believed in is of a different kind.
Oh well; so, one should debunk the doctrine of “facts”. I’ve partly
already tried this. But when does one finish with the introduction
to a theory of relations?11
One can imagine that Wittgenstein liked Rhees’ obstinate at-
tachment to his philosophical convictions. In turn, Rhees
came to appreciate Wittgenstein’s philosophizing despite his
initial misgivings. Rhees’ intelligent unruliness, his acquain-
tance with the University of Manchester—where Wittgenstein
had once studied engineering—and his experiences in Wittgen-
stein’s homeland Austria may have further contributed to a
mutual sympathy. In any case, three years after their first en-
counter, Rhees and Wittgenstein had become discussion part-
ners also outside class:
At the end of the academic session, in June 1936, I had tea with him
and he talked about the question of what he should do now. His
fellowship was coming to an end, and the question was whether
he should try to get a job of some sort or go somewhere by himself
and spend his time working on his book. (Rhees 1984, 208–9)
As it turned out, Wittgenstein left Cambridge in order to re-
turn to Skjolden, Norway, where he had made decisive break-
throughs for what became his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
More than 20 years after this experience, he now envisaged go-
ing there again to work on his second philosophical book. He
11 Letter from Rhees to Kastil, 5 January 1935, Franz Brentano Archiv Graz,
inventory number 000643–000645; original in German, translation by Tina
Schirmer and Christian Erbacher.
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had written a huge number of remarks during his fellowship
at Cambridge. His latest strategy for turning them into a book
had been to dictate to two students and friends throughout the
academic year—four days a week for several hours at a time.12
Wittgenstein wanted to translate the results of this dictation into
German whilst staying at his cabin in Skjolden. Having been
built especially for him before the Great War, this small house
was located in an isolated spot at bottom of the Sognefjord.
Wittgenstein arrived at his cabin in August 1936 and be-
gan revising the voluminous dictation with the working title
Philosophische Untersuchungen—Versuch einer Umarbeitung. Af-
ter working through 180 pages, he suddenly stopped, drew a
line and put down a devastating judgment: “This whole at-
tempt at a revision from page 118 up to this point is worth-
less”.13 This uncompromising rejection turned out to be a
decisive moment in Twentieth Century philosophy: in early
November Wittgenstein began writing a new manuscript en-
titled Philosophische Untersuchungen.14 On the first page he de-
clared this new manuscript to be a bad Christmas present for
his sister. Even so, what he produced was a beautiful, fair copy
of 188 handwritten paragraphs. Today it is considered the very
first version of what posthumously appeared as Wittgenstein’s
Philosophical Investigations.
For Rush Rhees, 1936 also proved to be a turning point be-
cause he gave up his ambition to finish his dissertation. Moore,
12The dictations were later published in Wittgenstein (1958); for informa-
tion on the circumstances of dictating, see Bouwsma (1961).
13Wittgenstein (2000b, Ms 115); the revision begins at page 118 (= Ms 115,
118[1]) and ends on page 297 (= Ms 115, 297[5]). The original is in German;
double underlining is transcribed as italics. An edition of the manuscript is
published in Wittgenstein (1958); transcripts and facsimiles of the items in
Wittgenstein’s Nachlass can be found in Wittgenstein (2000b) and online at
www.wittgensteinsource.com.
14Wittgenstein (2000b, Ms 142); in German this very first version of the
Philosophical Investigations is referred to as “Urfassung” (foundational version)
in Wittgenstein (2001).
his supervisor, was very sorry to learn of this; like Rhees’ pre-
vious colleagues and superiors, Moore felt he had benefited
immensely from discussions with Rhees and regarded him as
“exceptionally well qualified to lecture” (Phillips 2006, 271).
Abandoning the idea of submitting a dissertation, however,
did not mean Rhees would give up philosophical writing al-
together. Rhees travelled to Austria in order to resume studies
with Kastil, who was by then professor emeritus and living in
Vienna. Returning to England from this sojourn, Rhees sub-
stituted for his former professor at the University of Manch-
ester in 1937, teaching a wide range of topics in philosophy.
Wittgenstein travelled back and forth between Vienna, Cam-
bridge and Norway during these years. In Spring 1938, when
Nazi Germany annexed Austria, Wittgenstein decided to apply
for British citizenship and stay in England. Soon afterwards, he
resumed lecturing at Cambridge. Rhees, who lived in London
since his temporary post at the University of Manchester had
expired, was among the hand-picked invitees to Wittgenstein’s
classes on aesthetics and religious belief.15 This refreshed their
relationship and led to a phase of intensive cooperation.
Wittgenstein and Rhees met every afternoon for about three
consecutive weeks in the Autumn of 1938, mainly to discuss
the problem of continuity (Rhees 1970, vii). Rhees was trying to
write down his account of continuity in immediate experience.
Like before, his treatment built on Brentano’s theories of rela-
tions and the continuum.16 But this was not what he discussed
with Wittgenstein; he later remembered:
15Notes from the lectures were later published as Wittgenstein (1966); see
also Monk (1991, 402) and Wittgenstein’s letter to Rhees from 15 July 1938 in
Wittgenstein (2011).
16Rhees’ extensive, but fragmentary treatise of 77 typewritten pages has
been discovered recently. An edited excerpt is published in Erbacher and
Schirmer (2016). A comprehensive edition of the fragment will appear in Er-
bacher’s forthcoming book on the work of Wittgenstein’s literary executors.
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I came to know Wittgenstein after I had known Kraus and studied
Brentano, and I was interested to learn if I could whether Wittgen-
stein had read Brentano. I think it is certain that he had not. . . .
And I cannot really find anything in Wittgenstein which reminds
me of Brentano.17
Wittgenstein’s acquaintance with the problem of continuity had
another background. Ten years earlier, in 1928, he had attended
a lecture entitled “The structure of the Continuum” by the
mathematician Luitzen Brouwer (see Brouwer 1996). It is said
that the experience of Brouwer’s lectures on the intuitionist so-
lution to the foundational crisis of mathematics was a main rea-
son for Wittgenstein to return to Cambridge and to take up his
philosophical writing (Stadler 1997, 449–50). In the notebooks
Wittgenstein wrote upon his return, the problem of continuity
appears, as well.18 Now, whereas Rhees deliberately excluded
the mathematical concept of continuity in his study, Wittgen-
stein began discussing with Rhees precisely the use of continu-
ity in mathematics and then went on to treat the use of conti-
nuity outside mathematics (Rhees 1970, 157). These discussions
could take hours (Rhees 1970, vii). They found that dissecting
continuity may have served certain purposes in mathematics,
but that philosophical confusion was produced when one tried
to transfer those mathematical terms to other contexts, for in-
stance to the perception of continuous movement. Only then
did the puzzle arise of how a continuity of movement could
be built using individuated positions and points (Rhees 1970,
157). Thus, what was puzzling about the problem of continu-
ity was not that continuity actually was discontinuous; rather,
the puzzlement was created by transferring a mathematically
useful conception to a non-mathematical context.
17Rhees to McGuinness, 6 May 1963, RBA, UNI/SU/PC/1/1/3/5. Under-
linings in the original letter are transcribed as italics.
18Wittgenstein (2000b, Mss 105–107). These notebooks contain Wittgen-
stein’s so-called phenomenological phase. The problem of continuity ap-
pears, for example, in Ms 106, 38.
Rhees took notes from his discussions with Wittgenstein and
published them later as “On Continuity: Wittgenstein’s Ideas,
1938” (Rhees 1970, 104–57). At the same time, he tried to for-
mulate his own account of continuity, and Wittgenstein encour-
aged him in this ambition:
As you know, I wish you lots of luck with your writing. Just stick
to it; and if possible, sacrifice coherence sometimes. I mean, if you
feel you could just now say something, but it isn’t exactly the thing
which ought to come in this place—rather say it and jump about
it a bit than stick to the ‘single track’ and not get on. That is, if you
can do it. If you can’t jump, just plod on.19
Despite Wittgenstein’s encouragement to submit this work as
an application for a fellowship, Rhees would not send it off.
Wittgenstein expressed his disagreement with this decision:
I found your first chapter here and was disappointed that you had
not sent it in. I think it was wrong not to do it and I think you
ought still to do it if there is a chance that it might be overlooked
that you’re a bit late. I have only glanced at a few pages & can’t do
more at present, but I didn’t at all have a bad impression! So why
the hell you should wish to be your own examiner I can’t see.20
Rhees measured his philosophical writing according to the
highest possible standards. His reluctance to submit a doctoral
dissertation and his draft on continuity (as well as his reluc-
tance to publish in later life) testifies to his belief that he sel-
dom achieved the originality in his writing that he demanded
from himself. His merciless self-criticism coupled with humil-
ity and an unwillingness to compromise with the customs of
academic life certainly hindered Rhees from pursuing a smooth
academic career; but who may have understood him better than
19Letter from Wittgenstein to Rhees, 9 September 1938, in Wittgenstein
(2012, 230). Numbers refer to the numbering of letters in this book (and not
to the book’s pagination).
20Letter from Wittgenstein to Rhees, 3 October 1938, in Wittgenstein (2012,
233).
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Wittgenstein in this respect? Perhaps it was a shared attitude
towards the requirements of decent writing in philosophy that
made Rhees especially sensitive and attentive to Wittgenstein’s
concerns about publishing his work. In any case, Rhees became
Wittgenstein’s confidant in the question of publishing. This is
understood, for instance, from a letter Wittgenstein wrote in the
Summer of 1938:
. . . this morning I had an idea which I can’t very easily explain to
you in writing. The gist of it is that I am thinking of publishing
something before long after all so as to end the constant misun-
derstandings and misinterpretations. I very much want to talk the
business over with you.21
At this time, a couple of texts were circulating which Witt-
genstein considered plagiarism and misrepresentations of his
views. Some of his students had written about his new philos-
ophy on several occasions. Richard Braithwaite had published
his impression of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, to which Wittgen-
stein responded with a disclaimer in Mind, stating that one part
of Braithwaite’s presentation was inaccurate and the other false
(Wittgenstein 1933; Monk 1991, 335). When Alice Ambrose
wanted to publish an article on Wittgenstein’s view on finitism
in mathematics, Wittgenstein disapproved of the idea and tried
to hinder the article’s appearance in Mind (Monk 1991, 346).
In early 1936, well after Wittgenstein had abandoned working
with Waismann on a book intended to present his ideas, Wais-
mann published an article and Wittgenstein accused him of ap-
propriating ideas without acknowledging that he was the au-
thor of the views and similes put forward.22 As a consequence,
Wittgenstein would not meet Waismann again, although the lat-
ter had also immigrated to England and settled in Cambridge
21Letter from Wittgenstein to Rhees, 13 July 1938, in Wittgenstein (2012,
227).
22Letter from Wittgenstein to Waismann, 19 May 1936, quoted in Pichler
(2004, 135).
by 1938.23 These events incited Wittgenstein to publish his
works. In addition, since he had resolved to live permanently in
England, a publication might have been helpful, if not manda-
tory, for continuing his work at the university.24 Thus, Wittgen-
stein envisioned publishing the typed and reworked version
of the manuscript he had created in Skjolden.25 He wanted to
know if Rhees would make an attempt to translate the book:
I think it was in June 1938 that Wittgenstein asked me if I would
translate his book—certainly before the beginning of July. And he
sent me a copy of his preface soon after this, asking me to translate
it. Moore had already given me the typescript of the Untersuchun-
gen which Wittgenstein had given him . . . 26
Why Rhees was asked to do the translation may partly have
to do with his familiarity with Wittgenstein’s philosophizing
and the fact that he had a good command of Austrian Ger-
man. However, Theodore Redpath, another regular attendee of
Wittgenstein’s lectures at that time, was also asked to translate
the preface. Redpath agreed and reported what an exhausting
task working with Wittgenstein could be:
We sat for several hours one day thinking out not only every
sentence, but pretty well every word, and Wittgenstein got very
worked up when he (or we) could not find words or phrases which
entirely satisfied him. Time and again I found myself wishing to
heaven that he would let me work on the German quite alone and
present him with a version which he could then comment on and
revise, but he pushed inexorably on, and though his interposi-
tions were sometimes quite awry, as well as exasperating, one did
23See Monk (1991, 335, 346); Wittgenstein would also try to make Norman
Malcolm and others publish a correction of John Wisdom’s presentation of his
philosophy: see Malcolm (1958, 57–59).
24I am especially indebted to Peter Keicher for this suggestion.
25Wittgenstein (2000b, Ts 220); this typescript is referred to as “Frühfas-
sung” (early version) of the Philosophical Investigations in Wittgenstein (2001).
26Letter from Rhees to von Wright, 13 May 1977, RBA, UNI/SU/PC/
1/2/1/3.
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learn something from the procedure, and it gave one an insight
into Wittgenstein’s fanatical care both for accuracy and for style.
(Redpath 1990, 73)
Rhees was probably one of the few people prepared for the
struggle of crafting each and every formulation. In October
1938, Cambridge University Press agreed to publish the book
in a bilingual edition under the title Philosophische Bemerkungen
(Philosophical Remarks),27 and Rhees worked on his translation
throughout the Autumn and Winter. He regularly met with
Wittgenstein for discussions. In January 1939, Rhees’ father
died and Rhees travelled to the United States. Before depart-
ing, he left the translation with Wittgenstein.28 It was deemed
unsatisfactory (Monk 1991, 414). But although Wittgenstein dis-
approved of the translation, he was always, in the same breath,
keen to emphasize Rhees’ qualities. To Moore he wrote: “please
don’t mention to anyone that I don’t think highly of the trans-
lation. Rhees did his very best & the stuff is damn difficult to
translate.”29 A few days later, Wittgenstein pointed out to John
Maynard Keynes, to whom he had sent the German manuscript
together with the translation: “Yes, the translation is pretty aw-
ful, & yet the man who did it is an excellent man.”30 Wittgen-
stein’s high esteem for Rhees was not altered by the disappoint-
ment over his translation, as is also evident from a recommen-
dation that Wittgenstein wrote soon after:
I have known Mr R Rhees for 4 years; he has attended my lec-
tures on philosophy and we have had a great many of discussions
both on philosophical and general subjects. I have been strongly
impressed by the great seriousness and intelligence with which he
27Letter from Wittgenstein to Rhees, 6 October 1938, in Wittgenstein (2012,
234); see also Wittgenstein (2001, 20).
28The translation can be found in Wittgenstein (2000b, Ts 226).
29Letter from Wittgenstein to Moore, 1 February 1939, in Wittgenstein
(2012, 240).
30Letter from Wittgenstein to Keynes, 8 February 1939, in Wittgenstein
(2012, 242).
tackles the problem. Mr Rhees is an exceptionally kind and helpful
man and will spare no trouble to assist his students. His German
is very good indeed. (Quoted in Phillips 2006, 271–72)
Von Wright 1
Rhees’ translation never appeared in print.31 Wittgenstein be-
gan to revise it but soon gave up the idea of publishing the book
at all. His dissatisfaction with the translation was most likely
not the only reason (see Wittgenstein 2001, 19–21). In early
1939, Keynes informed Wittgenstein that he had been elected
to succeed Moore as professor of philosophy.32 Wittgenstein
may then have seen a possibility to improve the book. After re-
ceiving word of his election, Wittgenstein resumed lecturing on
the foundations of mathematics—the theme that was supposed
to make up his book’s second part. Again, Rhees was among
the attendees of these lectures, which were held twice a week
in a friend’s room at King’s College.33 One day, two new faces
appeared in class, as Redpath recalled:
Knowing his aversion to such invasions, I wondered what would
happen. If I remember rightly, Wittgenstein asked them what they
were doing there and whether they intended to follow the course.
They didn’t really answer, at all events to his satisfaction. Indeed
he hardly gave them time to, for he added, quite uncompromis-
ingly: ‘I don’t want any tourists here, you know!’ They were,
however, allowed to stay for the rest of the lecture. (Redpath 1990,
86)
31Though Rhees’ translation (Wittgenstein 2000b, Ts 226) never appeared in
print, P. M. S. Hacker and J. Schulte have consulted it, together with Wittgen-
stein’s comments on it, for their new translation of Philosophical Investigations
(2009). I thank an anonymous reviewer for making me aware of this fact.
32Letter from Keynes to Wittgenstein, 11 February 1939, in Wittgenstein
(2012, 243); Monk (1991, 415).
33Wittgenstein (2003a, 350); notes from the lectures were later published
as Wittgenstein (1976b). A new edition of Wittgenstein’s lectures from this
period is about to appear as Wittgenstein (forthcoming).
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One of the intruders was Georg Henrik von Wright. He too
described the encounter:
I went to his lecture in a room in King’s College, introduced myself
when he entered, and said that I had the chairman’s permission to
attend lectures in the faculty. Wittgenstein muttered something
which I did not understand, and I seated myself among the audi-
ence. He started to lecture and I became at once fascinated. “The
strongest impression any man ever made on me”, I wrote in my di-
ary that same day—and the statement remains true. At the end of
the lecture, however, Wittgenstein expressed his great annoyance
at the presence of ‘visitors’ in his class. He seemed furious. Then
he left the room without waiting for an apology or explanation. I
was hurt and shocked. My first impulse was to give up efforts to
approach this strange man. (von Wright 1989, 10–11)
Von Wright, a 22 year-old doctoral student from Helsinki, was
not accustomed to such a brusque rejection. Indeed, his life up
to this point seems to have been completely governed by polite
conduct and gentle deportment. Nothing similar to the rup-
tures and rebelliousness that characterize Rhees’ early biogra-
phy can be discovered in descriptions of von Wright’s youth.
However, like Rhees, von Wright was wholeheartedly deter-
mined to make his way in philosophy.
Born in 1916, von Wright had grown up in a wealthy and
well-educated family that was part of Finland’s Swedish speak-
ing elite.34 His father had graduated from the Swedish commer-
cial college and had gone on to study economics and philoso-
phy at the University of Helsinki. Though he could have pur-
sued an academic career, he chose to become a businessman.
Despite his success in business, the son admired him not for be-
ing a smart manager but for being a generous gentleman, a fine
34Most of the biographical information in this section can be found in von
Wright (1989) and von Wright (2001). For the sake of readability, additional
citations are only given in cases of direct quotations or when a source different
from these was used or when it seemed to be of special interest to the reader
to refer to specific pages.
intellectual who met with the academics, writers and publish-
ers who attended Helsinki’s cultural salons. Von Wright’s ed-
ucation and physical care were left to his mother. She too had
graduated from the Swedish commercial college and thereafter
had continued her education in Germany. When von Wright
was twelve years old, he and his mother went to a health-resort
in Merano, Italy, which at the time was under the jurisdiction of
Austria. Here, von Wright not only received private lessons in
German but was also introduced to geometry by his mother—
an experience von Wright regarded as his “intellectual awaken-
ing”:
It happened through my acquaintance with the elements of geom-
etry in the spring 1929. This gave me a tremendous thrill—and
sleepless nights of thinking about triangles and circles, cones and
spheres, and the mysterious number π, whose value it was impos-
sible to tell ‘exactly’. (von Wright 1989, 4)
Only a few months later, around Christmas in 1929, the now
thirteen year-old von Wright asked his father what “philos-
ophy” was. In response, his father gave him a small selec-
tion of books. While reading them, he decided that philoso-
phy would become his subject—and Georg Henrik von Wright
would never question this decision again. His early mastery
of German provided him with what would become his “spiri-
tual home”: the literature of Schiller and Goethe, Nietzsche and
Schopenhauer (von Wright 1989, 8).
Having made his vocational choice at this early stage in his
life, von Wright began studying philosophy at the University of
Helsinki immediately after finishing secondary school in 1934.
A few years before, Eino Kaila (whose wife was a cousin of von
Wright’s mother) had been appointed professor of theoretical
philosophy at the University of Helsinki. Von Wright admired
him as a strong, charismatic person who was able to captivate
large audiences. Kaila had earned his doctorate with a disser-
tation in experimental psychology and, as a professor, raised
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a whole generation of Finnish philosophers and psychologists
in a new scientific spirit.35 During the years that immediately
preceded von Wright’s matriculation, Kaila had been in contact
with Rudolf Carnap and Moritz Schlick in Vienna. Since the Vi-
enna Circle had gone public with its program in the late 1920s,
Kaila paid research visits to Vienna and conducted psycholog-
ical research in the city orphanage. Back in Helsinki, he was
developing his own branch of logical empiricism. When von
Wright began studying at university, Kaila was about to reach
the peak of his academic creativity.
At the beginning of his studies, von Wright expressed to
Kaila, perhaps naively, a preference for logic more than psy-
chology (von Wright 2001, 54). As a consequence, Kaila intro-
duced him to the writings of Carnap, and this was decisive for
von Wright’s career (von Wright 2001, 55–56). It only took one
semester for von Wright to be convinced that logic would be his
“gateway to serious philosophizing” (von Wright 1989, 5). At
only twenty years old, he committed himself to the idea of be-
coming a professional in “Logistic Philosophy”. This was also
the title of an article the young von Wright published in the
Swedish intellectual journal Nya Argus (1938). This article dis-
plays his gift of expressing philosophical ideas in an accurate,
clear, and easily accessible language which is neither too tech-
nical nor too simplistic. Von Wright honed this skill of writ-
ing lucidly for a broad audience by regularly contributing short
essays to the student journal. Meanwhile, the article “Logis-
tic Philosophy” shows that von Wright cleaved to the views of
the positivistic movement. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, which Kaila
had chosen as the topic for von Wright’s final exam in philos-
ophy, is also mentioned in this early piece and interpreted in a
positivistic vein: von Wright celebrates the Tractatus as the first
35For this and the subsequent information on Kaila, see von Wright’s Intro-
duction to Kaila (1979).
great work of logistic philosophy, the consequences of which
were explicated by the Vienna Circle.
After graduating with a Master of Arts in Philosophy in 1937,
von Wright wanted to proceed immediately to doctoral studies
(von Wright 2001, 69–70). His suggestion to Kaila was to write
a dissertation on “The Justification of Induction”. Von Wright
was aware of the problem’s tradition in philosophy, especially
of Aristotle’s and Hume’s expositions of the inconclusiveness
of inductive inferences. The most important reason for mak-
ing this suggestion, however, was that the problem of inductive
reasoning was currently of prime interest for the type of logis-
tic philosophy that aimed at clarifying the logic of the empir-
ical sciences. Von Wright developed an understanding of the
great role of inductive reasoning in the practice of research as
well as in everyday life. Though Kaila had originally planned
another topic for von Wright’s dissertation—namely, a compar-
ison of a Platonic and an Aristotelian philosophy of science—he
approved of von Wright’s suggestion.
Reading Hume and Bacon on the problem of induction
shifted von Wright’s focus towards philosophical works orig-
inally written in English. The works he had studied up to that
point had been written almost exclusively in German. In fact,
von Wright had not learned English before he began study-
ing the classic works on the problem of induction (von Wright
2001, 71). Von Wright used the literature on his doctoral topic
for learning English that became the new lingua franca of sci-
ence since Nazi Germany intellectually desiccated the German-
speaking academia. First and foremost von Wright studied trea-
tises by Keynes, Braithwaite and Charlie D. Broad. Since all
these authors taught at Cambridge at that time, and since the
Vienna Circle was practically dissolved, it was only natural for
von Wright to choose Cambridge as his destination for a period
of study abroad which was a traditional element in Finnish doc-
toral studies.
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Von Wright arrived at Cambridge in early March 1939 (von
Wright 2001, 72–77). Without having made any official pre-
arrangements, he moved into a hotel and simply approached
the scholars he knew from his readings. Upon paying his first
visit to Braithwaite, he was surprised to hear that Wittgenstein
currently taught at Cambridge. Without a second of doubt, von
Wright wanted to attend his classes. When visiting Broad, who
was the faculty chairman, he asked for permission to partici-
pate in courses in philosophy. Having Broad’s permission in
his pocket, von Wright went to Wittgenstein’s class at King’s
College: here, as we saw, he was expelled, perhaps for the first
and only time in his life. But contrary to his initial impulse of
giving up trying to approach Wittgenstein, von Wright had the
courage to write a letter to the man who had made such a strong
impression on him through only one encounter. To his great
surprise, he immediately received a friendly response with an
invitation for tea for 4:45 pm on March 10th. This was still dur-
ing von Wright’s first days in Cambridge.
The conversation von Wright and Wittgenstein enjoyed that
afternoon was the first step in their long friendship. What
Wittgenstein found most interesting about his young visitor
was probably not his belief in logistic philosophy. Wittgen-
stein knew this agenda from his discussions with Waismann,
Schlick and Carnap. He had never considered philosophy a sci-
ence and was against deriving theories or principles from the
Tractatus or his new philosophy. In fact, just a few days before
Wittgenstein and von Wright met, Wittgenstein had made this
clear at the Moral Sciences Club (see Wittgenstein 2003a, 334–35,
377-80). By contrast, what Wittgenstein found of interest may
have been that he met in von Wright a young man who shared
an upbringing rooted in the non-aristocratic and non-religious
cultural nobility of the central European world of the 19th cen-
tury. In any case, according to von Wright, he and Wittgenstein
did not talk about philosophy during their first meeting. They
talked instead about architecture and Scandinavia, the land-
scape Wittgenstein had come to adore since sojourning in Nor-
way.36
It seems that a common ground for their conversation was
not their philosophical views but a cultural resemblance. In-
deed, there was a side to the young von Wright that could not
be descried from his professional interest in logistic philosophy.
His intellectual passions were aroused by the 19th century art
historian and humanist Jakob Burckhardt, and he was greatly
inspired by the philosopher of history Oswald Spengler, whose
books he first came across in his father’s library.37 Spengler’s
morphology of world history put von Wright in a mood he de-
scribed as his ‘early Spenglerism’ that was in his own words:
. . . to view history as a sort of tableau vivant, to be looked at in awe
and contemplated like a work of art. In the details of history one
should try to discern the typical, the ‘morphological similarities’,
the recurrent patterns. The great changes, the crises and revolu-
tions of history, are like earthquakes and other catastrophes in na-
ture. They cannot be judged under the moral categories of justice
and rightness. But they may, like life as whole, be seen in the light
of ‘tragedy’. (von Wright 1989, 8)
Although “rightness” was no category for contemplating his-
tory, “greatness” certainly was. “Greatness” was the element
von Wright integrated into his Spenglerism from reading Jakob
Burckhardt, in whose writing he found:
. . . greatness of achievement but also of personality (Goethe,
Leonardo). Greatness is an unpredictable chance element in his-
36Wittgenstein wrote to von Wright six months after their discussion: “I
wish I were in that landscape of yours. It must be similar to the landscape in
Norway, which I love.” Letter from Wittgenstein to von Wright, 13 September
1939, in Wittgenstein (2012, 263).
37Von Wright read the German original of Spengler’s The Decline of the West
in the editions Spengler (1922) and Spengler (1923). The original copies from
the library of von Wright’s father can be consulted at WWA.
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tory; it is largely through greatness that the typical and recurrent
gets its individuality. (von Wright 1989, 8)
Thus, in contrast to a pure cultural pessimism often associated
with Spengler’s subsequently proverbial book-title of The De-
cline of the West, von Wright’s early Spenglerism involved a
glowing appreciation of past cultures and great personalities.
This sense of greatness and a romantic belief in humanity’s cul-
tural refinement through education were surely present in his
first conversation with Wittgenstein, even though they did not
explicitly talk about Spengler who Wittgenstein regarded as one
of the authors that influenced him.38
Wittgenstein visited von Wright for discussing philosophy
in the Easter vacation and invited him to attend his classes in
Easter term (von Wright 2001, 77; 1989, 11). He continued lec-
turing on the foundations of mathematics. During the lectures
von Wright did not try to take notes, but wanted to concen-
trate on Wittgenstein’s train of thought. Retrospectively, he
confessed that he had understood next to nothing (von Wright
1989, 11). But already then, he was aware of witnessing a his-
torical moment when Wittgenstein and the young Alan Turing
fought what appeared to him dramatic intellectual duels (von
Wright 2001, 77). Rhees and Norman Malcolm also attended
these lectures, and both became good friends and colleagues of
von Wright in later life. In 1939, however, von Wright did not
associate with either of them (von Wright 1989, 11). After all, his
main purpose for being at Cambridge was to work on his dis-
sertation, and he pursued this goal with great determination.
The greater part of his stay at Cambridge von Wright spent ei-
ther in the library or in discussions with Broad, who grew very
fond of his student from Helsinki (von Wright 1989, 12). Broad
would become von Wright’s influential mentor and promoter.
38See von Wright (2001, 127); Wittgenstein’s note on Spengler’s influence is
to be found in Wittgenstein (2000b, Ms 154, 15v). The remark stems from 1931
and is published in Wittgenstein (1980a).
He invited von Wright to dine at the High Table of Trinity Col-
lege where the bright young gentleman impressed all fellows
he met.39 This detail is remarkable for it gives an idea of von
Wright’s outstanding diplomatic talents: within a few weeks, he
won favor with both the academic establishment at Cambridge
and Wittgenstein, whose position can be regarded as diametri-
cally opposed to that academic establishment. Indeed, Wittgen-
stein and Broad had for a long time been intellectual antipodes
at Cambridge.40 Wittgenstein was appalled by the artificiality
of the conversation at the High Table, where he was once rep-
rimanded for not wearing a tie (Malcolm 1958, 30). Broad, on
the other hand, could not stand Wittgenstein’s appearances at
meetings of the Moral Sciences Club and had asked him to stop
attending.41 This coincided with complaints from others that
Wittgenstein tended to disturb and dominate the meetings. Ac-
cordingly, Wittgenstein had not been at the Moral Sciences Club
between 1931 and 1938.42 Though he resumed participating a
few weeks before von Wright’s arrival, there is no documenta-
tion that Wittgenstein was present when von Wright gave a talk
on “The Justification of Induction” on 25 May 1939.43
Von Wright’s talk at the Moral Sciences Club testifies to the
39Letter from Broad to von Wright, 17 July 1939, National Library of Finland
(hereafter abbreviated NLF), Coll. 714.28–32.
40See Broad (1959b). Already in 1925 Broad wrote in the preface to his
book (Broad 1925): “In the meanwhile I retire to my well-earned bath-chair,
from which I shall watch with a fatherly eye the philosophic gambols of
my younger friends as they dance to the highly syncopated pipings of Herr
Wittgenstein’s flute.” Wittgenstein, in turn, mentioned Broad in his lectures
of the academic year 1931–32: see Wittgenstein (1982b, 72–81).
41See Broad (1959a, 61), Monk (2001, 201), and Letter from Wittgenstein to
Russell, 28 November 1935, in Wittgenstein (2012, 199).
42According to James Klagge in a note to the author, Wittgenstein was pay-
ing dues to the Moral Sciences Club again in Fall 1938.
43The minutes of the meeting with von Wright’s talk are brief and do not
indicate whether or not Wittgenstein was present. The minutes from the pre-
vious week’s talk by Ayer show that Wittgenstein participated in that discus-
sion. I am very thankful to James Klagge for this information.
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influence that Wittgenstein had on him after only a few intense
encounters. One can almost sense a departure from logical posi-
tivism when von Wright introduced the problem of induction as
a “pseudo-problem” and then specified it as “a confusion of pic-
tures which we associate with different terms”.44 While his no-
tion of “pseudo-problem” belongs to the logistic diction, “con-
fusion of pictures” sounds much more like the Wittgenstein of
the 1930s. In his talk, von Wright presented the inductive prob-
lem as the “demand for a proof that inductive inference if not
with certainty so at least with considerable degree of probability
will be true”. Von Wright argued that the solution of this prob-
lem lay not in finding or constructing such a proof, but rather
in avoiding the philosophical error that leads to the demand for
proof in the first place. This too reminds us of Wittgenstein. So
also does the very end of von Wright’s talk, which is written in
his hand at the end of his typescript:
. . . the problem of finding a justification of induction is no problem
at all in the proper sense of the word, that what matters is not that
the justification of induction is lacking, but rather: that there is
nothing to justify.
The inductive problem—like so many other problems in
philosophy—is like a mist and to solve the problem is to make
the mist disappear. What I have said is not meant to be a proof
for this, I have merely tried to point out a way, which if followed
ought to contribute to a clarification of the ideas which we are apt
to connect with this particular problem.
This is one of the rare cases in which von Wright can be said
to have adopted a Wittgensteinian style. He later consciously
resisted the temptation to imitate Wittgenstein’s way of philos-
ophizing, but this early talk shows that Wittgenstein immedi-
ately left a stamp on von Wright’s thinking, and that von Wright
was capable of immediately recognizing and assimilating new
44This and the following quotatations are from the typescript for the talk
kept at WWA.
thoughts of great significance. Of this intellectual impact, he
later said:
What Wittgenstein did was to completely ‘shake me up’. The po-
sition in philosophy which I had come to hold during my studies
with Kaila was being called into question, the basic problems of
philosophy, which I had considered settled, revived. I felt that I
had to start again from scratch in philosophy. (von Wright 1989,
11)
Von Wright’s talk at the Moral Sciences Club in May 1939 was
warmly applauded and probably was yet another high point
of his five months at Cambridge (Redpath 1990, 87). As Sum-
mer approached, Wittgenstein offered to finance an extension
of von Wright’s stay, which he would be able to afford in his
future position as professor from Autumn 1939 onwards (von
Wright 2001, 77). Von Wright declined. As military airplanes
began to appear over Cambridge, he feared the outbreak of
war (von Wright 2001, 77–78). Von Wright discussed this issue
with Wittgenstein. Although he was aware that Wittgenstein
regarded Western civilization as a deteriorated culture, he was
shocked when Wittgenstein indeed wished for its destruction.
When von Wright asked him: “Do you really think that Europe
needs another war?”, Wittgenstein replied: “Not one, but two
or three” (von Wright 1995, 5). This statement was outrageous,
all the more since, as a young soldier, Wittgenstein had experi-
enced the cruelties of World War I.45
Von Wright left England before the Summer. From his family
residence at the Finnish coast, he wrote to Wittgenstein about
the significance of their acquaintance:
I must add very sincerely that already what I got from your lec-
tures and my discussions with you during my time in Cambridge
has given me a certain ‘tune’ to follow into a realm of thoughts,
on the border of which I am standing, trying to listen carefully in
45I am thankful to Harald Johannessen for directing my attention to this
aspect.
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order to take the right course to the place, from where the tune is
emanating. We do not know as yet wheather [sic] I shall arrive
there or whether I only shall take the wrong course over and over
again, but the fact that I hear the tune is enough to fill me with
life-long happiness and thankfulness for that I have met you and
been thought [sic] by you, even if for a very short time.46
Wittgenstein, in his reply, expressed that the appreciation of
both philosophical understanding and personal respect was
mutual, and almost like a premonition, he wrote about the book
manuscript that he had not sent to the printers at the beginning
of that year:
I should very much like to send you the M.S. of what would be
the first volume of my book. I have an idea that it shall never be
published in my lifetime & might perhaps be entirely lost. I should
like to know that you had read it & had a copy of it. Write me if
you like to have it; & if it can be sent I’ll send it to you.
I think it goes without saying that I shall always be exceedingly
glad to hear from you.47
Rhees 2
A few days after von Wright had written to Wittgenstein, World
War II broke out. Wittgenstein was greatly affected by this. In
his reply to von Wright he revealed his state of mind and occu-
pational doubts:
I can’t imagine how I shall be able to lecture. I feel as though,
under the present shameful & depressing circumstances, I ought
to do anything but discuss philosophical problems, with people
who aren’t really deeply interested in them anyway.
46Letter from von Wright to Wittgenstein, 27 August 1939, in Wittgenstein
(2012, 259); see also: Letter from von Wright to Wittgenstein, 22 February
1940, in Wittgenstein (2012, 269).
47Letter from Wittgenstein to von Wright, 13 September 1939, in Wittgen-
stein (2012, 263).
. . . everything that I do seems to me futile & I don’t know what
sort of life I ought to lead.48
Wittgenstein’s contempt for modern and Western ways of liv-
ing extended to the academic life that surrounded him. He had
always been in doubt about his role as a university teacher, and
he advised several students to leave academic philosophy for a
more practical occupation. The war aggravated these concerns.
Although Wittgenstein had just been appointed professor of
philosophy at Cambridge, he wrote to Rhees the very same day
he replied to von Wright’s letter, stating that he considered leav-
ing university again if the war should continue:
. . . I am as unclear about what I ought to do as ever, except that
I think, just now the right thing is to wait and see whether this
war really develops into a war or not for this still seems to me
very doubtful. In case it does I suppose one will get a job with
the Red Cross pretty easily and not so many occupations will be
‘reserved’.49
The 35 year-old Rhees shared Wittgenstein’s rejection of aca-
demic customs. He had, perhaps under Wittgenstein’s influ-
ence, taken a job as a welder at a factory in Swansea.50 Rhees
soon contemplated quitting, but Wittgenstein advised him to
stick to it:
No job will ever absolutely & entirely fit you (just as ready made
clothes don’t ever fit certain people). What I mean is: please
beware of drifting between jobs but thank the Lord that you’ve
found one which however moderately, fits you somewhat. For-
give me for writing to you in this way.51
48Letter from Wittgenstein to von Wright, 13 September 1939, in Wittgen-
stein (2012, 263).
49Letter from Wittgenstein to Rhees, 13 September 1939, in Wittgenstein
(2012, 261).
50I am indebted to Brian McGuinness, who pointed out that Wittgenstein’s
influence may have led Rhees to take the welding job.
51Letter from Wittgenstein to Rhees, 14 August 1940, in Wittgenstein (2012,
281).
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These words weighed heavily in Rhees’ conscience. In a long
letter written on New Year’s Eve 1940, Rhees struggled to justify
his decision to give up welding in order to take a teaching post
at the University of Swansea. He finally explained this decision
by appealing to yet another opinion of Wittgenstein:
I would like to say that I didn’t just disregard your advice. I
was worried by your suggestions at the time when I finally did
decide to come here; and I have seen a number of things which
favour your view since then. My welding kept on being bad, and
I thought (not so stupidly either) that it probably would never de-
velop into anything decent. There was a lot more that was con-
nected with this, but I’d better leave that out. I mention two con-
siderations which played a considerable part. One was that such
training as I had had was in the academic and pedagogical line.
. . . Another consideration, I confess, was a saying of yours which
kept recurring to me. Your first opinion, when I suggested that
I might go in for welding, was that it was foolish for me to try
it. And one of your remarks about that sort of job generally was,
‘It’s too impersonal’. This kept going around in my head as I kept
making a mess of things.52
It is probably fair to say that Rhees’ decision to give up weld-
ing was prudent. As in his earlier university posts, Rhees
proved his outstanding capacity as a teacher in philosophy. Be-
ing highly respected by students and colleagues, he would, in
later years, inspire the atmosphere at the department of philos-
ophy in Swansea with his honest and deep thinking. Moreover,
the post at the University of Swansea also introduced an ele-
ment of stability in a life full of discontinuities.
Visiting Rhees in 1942 and 1943, Wittgenstein discovered
Swansea to be a place of retreat and inspiration. Lecturing had
become unbearable to him. In the Autumn of 1941, he took a
job as a porter at Guy’s Hospital in London and scheduled his
lectures for the weekends. After a year and a half, in Spring
52Letter from Rhees to Wittgenstein, 31 December 1940, in Wittgenstein
(2012, 288).
of 1943, he moved to Newcastle where he assisted in a medi-
cal laboratory. During these years of war-work, Wittgenstein
paid visits to Rhees in Swansea. They attended meetings of the
Philosophical Society which Rhees had initiated and had many
philosophical discussions, for example about Freud and psy-
choanalysis.53 Just as Wittgenstein had come to like the Norwe-
gian landscape and people, he now came to like Wales and the
Welsh.
In his writing, Wittgenstein was still mainly occupied with
his remarks on the foundations of mathematics. He heav-
ily reworked them for the second part of his book and once
again considered publishing it.54 After discussions with Niko-
lai Bachtin (the older brother of Michail Bachtin), Wittgenstein
thought that the Tractatus and his new book ought to be printed
together in the same volume. Though Cambridge Univer-
sity Press had already received permission from Kegan Paul
to reprint the Tractatus, the plan of publishing the book was
once again abandoned, since Wittgenstein shifted the focus of
his work during his next stay in Swansea. In 1944, Trinity Col-
lege called Wittgenstein back to Cambridge, but he negotiated a
sabbatical from teaching and decided to spend it with Rhees in
Swansea. It was now that Wittgenstein entirely stopped work-
ing on the foundations of mathematics and turned towards in-
vestigating psychological concepts (Wittgenstein 2001, 23–24).
That Wittgenstein stopped elaborating his remarks on the
foundations of mathematics seems to be a far more signifi-
cant turn in his work than is usually recognized. For it was
Wittgenstein’s interest in the philosophy of mathematics that
brought him to philosophy in the first place: the idea of study-
ing the philosophy of mathematics incited him to visit Gott-
53Notes from their conversations are published in Wittgenstein (1966), a
memoir of a meeting at the Philosophical Society in Rhees (1984, 201). A new
edition of Rhees’ philosophical discussions with Wittgenstein has appeared
as Wittgenstein and Rhees (2015).
54Selections of these writings were later published in Wittgenstein (1976a).
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lob Frege in 1911, and Frege recommended him to study with
Bertrand Russell in Cambridge (McGuinness 1988, chap. 4). In
1928, Brouwer’s lectures on the foundational crisis of mathe-
matics contributed to Wittgenstein’s return to philosophy and,
in 1929, his first fellowship at Trinity College allowed him to
carry out work on the foundations of mathematics. Teaching
at Cambridge, Wittgenstein devoted many of his lectures to the
foundations of mathematics, and for several years his plan was
that remarks on this topic would constitute the second part
of his book. Now, after so many years of creating, selecting
and composing these remarks, he stopped working on them
entirely, without achieving a version he declared ready to be
published. It seems that just as the Tractatus took a new course
after Wittgenstein’s experiences in World War I, his work dur-
ing World War II was followed by a change in the course of
the Philosophical Investigations. While staying in Swansea be-
tween April and September 1944, Wittgenstein wrote 114 new
remarks (Wittgenstein 2000b, Ms 129). He read this new mate-
rial to Rhees and discussed it with him (Rhees 2006, 257):
He had read the last part of Part I aloud to me from Zettel clamped
together, in September 1944. I cannot remember now just how
much of the text now printed he read to me—partly because he
discussed other parts—or rather: expounded to me the points he
makes in them—when we walked or met indoors during earlier
months.55
I remember in particular the finish of it, when he read the para-
graph concluding “([sic]Man könnte auch von einer Tätigkeit der
Butter reden, wenn sie im Preise steigt; und wenn dadurch keine
Probleme erzeugt werden, so ist es harmlos.” This was at the end
of September, 1944. And I remember what a kick I got out of it. I
thought his stuff was wonderful.56
55Letter from Rhees to von Wright, 10 August 1972, WWA.
56Letter from Rhees to von Wright, 27 February 1969, WWA. The sentence
quoted by Rhees became the last sentence of the last paragraph (§693) in the
Philosophical Investigations. In Anscombe’s translation it reads: “(It would also
These remarks formulated during Wittgenstein’s stay in
Swansea in 1944 were later typed and incorporated into the
already-reworked typescript of the Philosophical Investigations.57
This may have been after Wittgenstein’s return to Cambridge
in Autumn 1944. There, he wrote what became the preface to
the posthumous edition of the Philosophical Investigations. Hav-
ing experienced Swansea as a stimulating place for philosophiz-
ing, it is no wonder that Wittgenstein later advised Rhees to
stay there when now it was Rhees who wanted to leave. Be-
ing strongly attracted to anarchistic thought, Rhees considered
joining a Trotskyist party. Wittgenstein objected: if one became
a party member one could not question the party line, whereas
in philosophy one had to be constantly prepared to change di-
rections (Rhees 1984, 207–8). Wittgenstein obviously regarded
Rhees as better suited for the latter and at the same time he
urged him not to change his occupational direction again, but
to accept the offer of a permanent post at the University of
Swansea:
I was glad to hear that they had the sense to offer you an appoint-
ment in Swansea. I wish to God you’d take it!! I don’t know,
of course, what your special reasons are for wanting to leave
Swansea, but please weigh them damn carefully. I should, for per-
sonal reasons, hate you to leave Swansea. Our talks & discussions
have done me good. Don’t stupidly throw away an opportunity
of doing some good. Your derogatory remarks about your philo-
sophical abilities & success are so much rubbish. You are all right.
And I mean just that: nothing more & nothing less.—Philosophical
influences much worse than yours & mine are spreading rapidly,
& it’s important that you should stay at your job. That your suc-
cess won’t be brilliant is certain; in fact it will be meagre, it’s bound
be possible to speak of an activity of butter when it rises in price, and if no
problems are produced by this it is harmless.)”
57The typescript containing the remarks that were written in Swansea are
published in Wittgenstein (2000b, Ts 241). A reconstructed typescript of
the subsequent version of the Philosophical Investigations, is referred to as
“Zwischenfassung” (intermediate version) in Wittgenstein (2001).
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to be. Please, if you possibly can, resign yourself to it & stay on.—
Don’t misunderstand me. I’m not trying to appear wise. I’m just
as silly as you are. But that doesn’t make you any less silly.
So long!
Ludwig Wittgenstein
P. S. Read this letter again from the beginning.58
Though this letter still echoes many of Wittgenstein’s previ-
ous recommendations to Rhees to stick with what he began,
its tone indicates that the relationship between the two men
had changed after the months they spent together in Swansea.
Wittgenstein no longer spoke as a tutor advising an undecided
student; Rhees was a discussion partner on equal footing, and
the two could speak frankly. Hence, after Wittgenstein re-
sumed lecturing in Cambridge, their correspondence became a
relaxed exchange between colleagues, two friends really, shar-
ing their experiences in the same occupation of teaching philos-
ophy. This comes across in a letter Wittgenstein wrote shortly
after returning to Cambridge:
I wish you one moderately intelligent & awake pupil to sweeten
your labour! Please look after your health. You can’t expect good
work when your health isn’t really good, & colds are nasty things.
I’ve so far been in good health, & consequently my classes haven’t
gone too bad. (Or should I say “badly”?) Thouless is coming to
them, & a woman, Mrs so & so who calls herself Miss Anscombe,
who certainly is intelligent, though not of Kreisel’s caliber.59
Anscombe 1
Unlike Rhees and von Wright, Elizabeth Anscombe did not en-
ter philosophy through the discipline’s modern focus on the
58Letter from Wittgenstein to Rhees, 21 May 1946, in Wittgenstein (2012,
352).
59Letter from Wittgenstein to Rhees, 28 November 1944, in Wittgenstein
(2012, 321).
empirical sciences and their logic. Her thinking was embedded
in and directed towards human action and its relations to rea-
son and God. Anscombe, the daughter of a schoolmaster and
a headmistress, fell for philosophy after reading a work called
Natural Theology written by a 19th century Jesuit:
The book contained an argument for the existence of a First Cause,
and as a preliminary to this it offered a proof of some ‘principle
of causality’ according to which anything that comes about must
have a cause. The proof had the fault of proceeding from a barely
concealed assumption of its own conclusion. I thought that this
was some sort of carelessness on the part of the author, and that
it just needed tidying up. So I started writing improved versions
of it; each one satisfied me for a time, but then reflection would
show me that I had committed the same fault. I don’t think I ever
showed my efforts to anyone; I tore them up when I thought they
were no good, and I went round asking people why, if something
happened, they would be sure it had a cause. No one had an an-
swer to this. In two or three years of effort I produced five versions
of a would-be proof, each one of which I then found guilty of the
same error, though each time it was more cunningly concealed.
In all this time I had no philosophical teaching about the matter;
even my last attempt was made before I started reading Greats at
Oxford. (Anscombe 1981a, vii)
In contrast to von Wright who, as a thirteen year-old, had asked
what philosophy was and then decided it should become his
subject, Anscombe unintentionally slipped into philosophizing
by stumbling upon a fallacy. Once her fascination for reasoning
was awakened, it became her life’s occupation.
In 1937, at the age of 18, Anscombe began studying classics
and philosophy (Literae Humaniores) at St. Hugh’s in Oxford, a
college that enabled women from all backgrounds to gain a uni-
versity education.60 Shortly after matriculation, she converted
to Roman Catholicism. This decision, she claimed, was based
60Much of the biographical information in this section can be found in
Teichmann (2008, 1–9).
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 4 no. 3 [17]
on her reading and reflection from twelve to fifteen years of
age (Anscombe 1981a, vi). At the Corpus Christi procession
the year after her conversion, she met another convert, Peter
Geach, whom she married three years later. Given that both
Anscombe and Geach were academic philosophers, it has been
suggested that—besides for aesthetic reasons—Anscombe kept
her maiden name in order to avoid ambiguity in their later pub-
lications (Teichmann 2001, 1).
Philosophy, faith and life—by some regarded as incompat-
ible—informed and enlightened each other and merged into a
unity in Anscombe’s conduct. She was able to employ reason to
answer a question that sprang from daily life while gaining ori-
entation for her reasoning from Catholic doctrines and tenets.
Hence, it could happen that she let teachings of the Catholic
Church lead her in philosophy. This is beautifully illustrated
by an event that probably took place in Blackwell’s bookshop
when Anscombe was an undergraduate student at Oxford. Her
daughter Mary Geach describes this event:
She had come across a passage in Russell to the effect that an ar-
gument from the facts about the world to the existence of God
could not be valid, as one could not deduce a necessary conclu-
sion from a contingent premiss. She had not at the time been able
to see what was wrong with the notion that necessities can only
be deduced from necessities, but she had known that to deny the
possibility of moving by reason from the facts about the world to a
knowledge of the existence of God was to deny a doctrine defined
as of faith by an ecumenical council.
She went then to church and made an act of faith; I suppose it was
the standard one ‘My God I believe in thee and all thy Church
doth teach, because thou hast said it and thy word is true’. She
realized later that of course one can derive necessary conclusion
from contingent premises. (Geach 2008, xvi)
It seems as though Russell’s reaching a conclusion that contra-
dicted her theological beliefs merely prompted her to try to see
more clearly where the fault of the argument was. And there
was no tension in this. In Anscombe’s case, faith and rationality
complemented each other. In particular, rather than providing
a foundation for religion, Anscombe may have found that log-
ical analysis helped to remove misunderstandings that hinder
belief.
The ability of bringing together rationality and faith was ev-
ident already in Anscombe’s first publication from 1939. In
this pamphlet entitled The Justice of the Present War Examined
(reprinted in Anscombe 1981b, 72–81), Anscombe derived from
Catholic principles seven necessary and, in combination, suffi-
cient conditions for a just war. She then carried out a sharp anal-
ysis of the conditions’ fulfillment in the actual case of British
policy in 1939 and came to the conclusion that the war of the
then-present government was not a just war. This early piece of
Anscombe’s writing weaves a dense texture of religious belief,
logical analysis and political criticism. These are seminal ele-
ments that would later differentiate into different lines of her
writing. However, Anscombe always remained interested in
arguments relevant for action, and in this she was not afraid
of defending unpopular views. In the particular case of her
undergraduate piece on the justice of war, criticism came not
only from the public and academic philosophers but also from
the Catholic Church. Anscombe and her co-author Norman
Daniel gave their pamphlet an extra description as expressing
a “Catholic view” (Anscombe 1981b, vii). The Archbishop of
Birmingham objected that they had no right to do so without
an official imprimatur. Dutifully, Anscombe and Daniel with-
drew the essay from bookshop-shops in Oxford and London
(Anscombe 1981b, vii).
Obeying the teachings of the Catholic Church did not mean
that Anscombe demanded such obedience from her partners in
philosophical discussion. She loved working on arguments as
such, and not only with regard to their potential implications
for religious thought. She could focus entirely on an argument’s
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structure and its significance for a discussion at hand. In doing
so, she was at first not particularly interested in the contexts
from which the arguments had historically originated. In this
sense she may properly be called an analytical philosopher from
the start. Her interest in the philosophical gist of an argument
became especially clear in her final exam at Oxford, when she
counterbalanced a rather incomplete knowledge of history and
literature with an outstanding performance in philosophy. In-
deed, it was due to her philosophical brilliance alone that she
earned exceptional honors in her exam.
After graduating from St. Hugh’s College, Anscombe re-
ceived a research studentship from Newnham, a women’s Col-
lege at Cambridge. From that time onwards, she participated
in almost all of Wittgenstein’s lectures, which mainly dealt with
the philosophy of psychology (Wittgenstein 2003a, 355–59). She
brought to them her original philosophical curiosity that could
not be contented by clever sophisms. Anscombe wanted to
work until her original puzzlement was truly dissolved, and
that is what the 25 year-old experienced in Wittgenstein’s lec-
tures:
For years I would spend time in cafés, for example, staring at ob-
jects saying to myself: ‘I see a packet. But what do I really see?
How can I say that I see here anything more than a yellow ex-
panse?’ . . . I always hated phenomenalism and felt trapped by it.
I couldn’t see my way out of it but I didn’t believe it. It was no
good pointing to difficulties about it, things which Russell found
wrong with it, for example. The strength, the central nerve of it
remained alive and raged achingly. It was only in Wittgenstein’s
classes in 1944 that I saw the nerve being extracted, the central
thought ‘I have got this, and I define yellow (say) as this’ being ef-
fectively attacked.—At one point in these classes Wittgenstein was
discussing the interpretation of the sign-post, and it burst upon me
the way you go by it is the final interpretation. (Anscombe 1981a,
xiii-ix)
It was the effort to get to the bottom of her philosophical
perplexities that made Wittgenstein’s lectures so valuable for
Anscombe. One might expect that her rather ahistorical inter-
est in philosophical arguments corresponded to Wittgenstein’s
attitude, but that would be misleading. Though Wittgenstein
has sometimes been imagined as a philosopher who neglected
the tradition of thought in the history of philosophy, Mary
Geach makes clear that it was Wittgenstein who stimulated
Anscombe’s interest in the great thinkers of the past:
She recorded that before she knew him [Wittgenstein], the great
philosophers of the past had appeared to her like beautiful statues:
knowing him had brought them alive for her.
. . .
She said to me once that the contemporary philosophy teachers
who called themselves philosophers were not philosophers: she
would not call herself one. Who was, I asked, and she named
Wittgenstein. She had learned, by walking and talking in the com-
pany of one of them, to move in the company of people who were,
in this restricted sense, philosophers; not merely listening, but se-
riously entering into their concerns and criticizing their thoughts.
This does not mean using a philosopher’s work as a text about
which to make erudite observations, nor did it mean taking him
as a banner for her cause, nor employing his name as a label for
a mindset which she might dislike: it meant interesting herself
in the topics that the philosopher discusses, taking his thoughts
apart, adopting some, finding deep problems through others, and
rejecting what she found silly. For she was quite capable of finding
a great philosopher silly. (Geach 2011, xiii)
As for Wittgenstein, philosophy for Anscombe primarily meant
the activity of discussing and arguing about a subject at hand.
This implied the decency to respect good arguments regardless
of who had uttered them or when. Ancient philosophers were
thus to be respected for their good thoughts, and faulty argu-
ments were to be rejected even if they were put forward by
great thinkers. Though this way of philosophizing was prob-
ably lived and fostered by Wittgenstein, it demanded a high
degree of independence from authorities. Anscombe demon-
strated such independence early on, for example in 1948, when
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she presented a paper to the Socratic Club at Oxford, criticiz-
ing an argument in Clive Staples Lewis’ (1947) book Miracles.
Lewis, the founder of the Club and already a prominent aca-
demic, was present at that event. Anscombe won what people
remembered as a tense argument and Lewis changed the re-
spective passage in a revised edition of his book.61
One may think that this was a bold attack by a young woman
in an academic surrounding that von Wright had experienced
to be completely dominated by men (von Wright 2001, 74). But
as Mary Geach once put it: someone who was bold enough
to confront Wittgenstein, could probably confront anyone.62
Anscombe’s faith may have emboldened her in bravely fac-
ing superiors and authorities, if indeed fear of God destroys all
earthly fears, as her husband once wrote.63 However, it is likely
that in order to stave off gender prejudices, her arguments had
to be more coherent and her attacks more precise than those
of her male colleagues. Anscombe’s intellectual assertiveness,
on the other hand, may have just as well provoked comments
on gender. Wittgenstein was not totally immune from this, as
Anscombe’s husband Peter Geach remembered:
I heard him address Elizabeth several times as ‘old man’ on sev-
eral occasions. It was not the only way in which he treated her
as an honorary male. Each year at the beginning of his course of
61The revised edition appeared in 1960.
62Note from personal conversation.
63See Geach (1969, 127): “worship of a supreme power . . . is wholly differ-
ent from, and does not carry with it, a cringing attitude towards earthly pow-
ers. An earthly potentate does not compete with God, not even unsuccess-
fully: he may threaten all manner of afflictions, but only from God’s hands
can any affliction actually come upon us. If we fully realize this, we shall
have such fear upon God as destroys all earthly fears”. An anonymous re-
viewer for JHAP made the following comment that is worth quoting here:
“Interestingly Wittgenstein expressed the very same thought in a diary en-
try from January 28, 1937: ‘I understood what it means that belief is bliss for
a human being, that is, it frees him from the fear of others by placing him
immediately under God.’” (Wittgenstein 2003a, 163).
lectures Wittgenstein would have a great many listeners, largely
female; this crowd would rapidly shrink to a hard core of regular
attenders by the third or fourth lecture. This happened in par-
ticular during one year’s attendance by Elizabeth; noticing this
shrinkage, Wittgenstein looked round the room with gloomy sat-
isfaction and remarked: ‘Thank God we’ve got rid of the women!’
(Geach 1988, xii)
This is probably best understood as a wry appreciation of
Anscombe’s abrasiveness and philosophical acumen. Wittgen-
stein regarded Anscombe as extraordinary talented, as is evi-
dent from a letter of recommendation that he wrote to Myra
Curtis, principal of Newnham College, when Anscombe’s stu-
dentship expired:
She is, undoubtedly, the most talented female student I have had
since 1930, when I began lecturing; and among my male students
only 8 or 10 either equaled or surpassed her. She has an excellent
grasp of philosophical problems, great seriousness, and ability for
hard work.64
Thus, already in 1945, Wittgenstein considered Anscombe
among his best 10 students he ever had. The emphasis of gen-
der in his letter may be accounted for by the fact that Newham
was a women’s college. However, even with such a recommen-
dation from a thinker like Wittgenstein, it was difficult to gain
a foothold in the academia of that time. During the hard transi-
tion period after her studentship, “Wittgenstein showed himself
a true friend” (Geach 1988, xi), as Peter Geach recollected:
We were very poor. He tried to persuade Newnham to do some-
thing for Elizabeth’s career; indeed though he regularly did not
wear a tie, he wore one for an interview with the Principal of the
College—quite in vain. Later on he paid the fee for Elizabeth to go
to a private maternity home for the birth of our second child, John
Richard, in December 1946. He refused to regard this as anything
64Recommendation by Wittgenstein to Curtis, 18 May 1945, in Wittgenstein
(2012, 324).
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but a gift: a characteristic expression of a generosity to which other
friends have borne witness. (Geach 1988, xi)
In 1946 Anscombe obtained a research fellowship from
Somerville College, Oxford. While living in Oxford, she trav-
elled regularly to Cambridge to visit Wittgenstein for discus-
sions. In addition to attending his lectures, she participated in
his tutorials on the philosophy of religion (Wittgenstein 2003a,
358; Monk 1991, 497–98). An expression by her husband seems
to capture her determination: “Elizabeth did not let her preg-
nancy interfere with attendance at Moral Sciences Club meet-
ings and at Wittgenstein’s lectures” (Geach 1988, xi).
Von Wright 2
In Wittgenstein’s last lecture at Cambridge in Spring term 1947,
Anscombe met a guest from Finland: Professor von Wright.65
Von Wright had pursued his academic career under the hard
circumstances of war. He had published the article “On Proba-
bility” in Mind in 1940, one year before defending his doctoral
dissertation. Shortly afterwards he was given a lectureship at
the University of Helsinki. As long as censorship during the
war permitted, von Wright had regularly corresponded with
Broad, who had praised von Wright’s dissertation in three long
contributions to Mind as the best treatment known to him of the
problem of induction (Broad 1944, 1). By 1947 von Wright was
professor in Helsinki and at times even held a second professor-
ship at the Academy of Åbo. When Broad invited von Wright
to lecture in Cambridge after the war, von Wright also received
invitations to lecture in London and Oxford. Before departing
for England, he informed Wittgenstein about his return to Cam-
bridge and invited him to his lectures. Wittgenstein replied:
I’m glad that you are going to lecture here, & I know that by at-
tending your lectures I could learn a very great deal. In spite of
65Notes from the lectures were later published in Wittgenstein (1988).
this I will not come to them—for the sole reason that, in order to
live & to work, I have to allow no import of foreign goods (i.e.,
philosophical ones) into my mind. For the same reason I haven’t
read your book, though I am convinced of its excellence. If you
think that I’m getting old—you’re right. So long! & good luck!66
As promised, Wittgenstein did not attend von Wright’s lectures;
but von Wright did attend Wittgenstein’s class, which marked
the endpoint of Wittgenstein’s lecture series on the philosophy
of psychology and, indeed, of his career as a university profes-
sor. During the sessions von Wright met Anscombe, Geach, and
Malcolm, all of whom became friends during and after the lec-
tures.
The adult von Wright sitting in Wittgenstein’s class in 1947
was very different from the doctoral student who had sat there
eight years earlier. Not only had he become a successful and
sought-after professor; he had married and started a family.67
Along with the changes in his professional and personal status,
his philosophical standpoints had changed significantly. In the
year of his dissertation, von Wright had written the book Den lo-
giska Empirismen (von Wright 1943) which was to him a farewell
to logical positivism. This sentiment was sustained in the talk
that von Wright gave to the Moral Sciences Club upon his return
to Cambridge. Contrasting his previous philosophical belief in
logistic philosophy, he turned in his talk to the activity that he
now called “analytical philosophy” and sketched the kinds of
problems it may tackle. One sentence—though it is crossed out
in the manuscript—is illustrative of his critical reflection on his
previous faith in logical positivism:
As a matter of fact there has on a comparatively large scale been
advocated in modern philosophy a conventionalist view that ap-
pears to have made philosophy almost to an art of sophistry. [I am
66Letter from Wittgenstein to von Wright, 21 February 1947, in Wittgenstein
(2001, 361).
67For information in this paragraph, see von Wright (2001, 79–113).
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thinking on the main trend of thought known as logical positivism
or logical empiricism as advocated in particular by Professor Car-
nap]68
The programmatic talk von Wright gave in 1947 stands in
stark contrast to what he had said as a doctoral student at
the same place almost exactly eight years earlier. Reading his
manuscript, one gets the impression that throughout the entire
talk, his matured intellect commented on his own statements
from 1939. Though von Wright’s professional philosophiz-
ing was still scientific in spirit, his intellectual passions were
nourished by his acquaintance with the distinguished Brazilian
diplomat Mario De Millo, in whose cultural world Nietzsche
was central and logical empiricism did not even exist. De Millo
had directed von Wright’s attention to the book Paideia (Jaeger
1934–1947), the third volume of which had just appeared. Von
Wright was immediately fascinated by this humanistic histori-
ography of higher education in Plato’s time. Paideia inspired
von Wright to write essays in a new vein, following more freely
his attraction to the work and style of a public intellectual
(von Wright 1947). This change was probably also noticed by
Wittgenstein, with whom von Wright repeatedly discussed dur-
ing his stay in Cambridge (von Wright 1989, 14). Wittgenstein
lent him the typescript of the then-current version of the Philo-
sophical Investigations, and von Wright read it on his way to lec-
tures in Oxford. This gave him insights into Wittgenstein’s un-
published work. Nevertheless, even more than the writings, the
philosophical conversations with Wittgenstein impressed von
Wright:
I saw a great deal of Wittgenstein and the impression he made on
me was even deeper than that of eight years earlier. Each conver-
sation with Wittgenstein was like living through the day of judg-
ment. It was terrible. Everything had constantly to be dug up
anew, questioned and subjected to the tests of truthfulness. This
68Quoted from the typescript for the talk kept at WWA, p. 10.
concerned not only philosophy but the whole of life. (von Wright
1989, 14)
The torment reverberating through this published passage is
also apparent in the sincere letter von Wright wrote to Wittgen-
stein after his return to Finland. Von Wright began the letter
by stressing the great philosophical benefit he had gained from
their renewed discussions:
Never before, to my memory, going abroad [sic] meant so much to
my education.
I learnt an enormous mass [of] philosophy. Why and how it came
to be so, you know as well as I do. What will be the consequences
of it, is not as yet to be foreseen,—I can only hope they will be of
more good than harm, in the long run. I know that a hard struggle
is needed before the imported goods will become my own. Certain
things will be ejaculated, other things assimilated. If, at the end,
no visible traces of your influence remain in my thought, which is
extremely unlikely, so shall I at least always have to acknowledge
that I learnt from you, how difficult philosophy must be, if it is
to be more than a collection of materials for academic controversy
and learned conversation.69
A second tone, as it were, grounds the significance of that en-
counter in a more existential dimension:
Still more, perhaps, did the stay in Cambridge mean to my human
being, so to say. It was as though something, which had begun to
grow in me in the last years, suddenly had ripened. Things which
I hardly thought of before, became of vital importance, new values
and ideals appeared and greatly revised my outlook on life.
A third tone, however, turns the chord into a minor key, as the
greatness von Wright experienced in Wittgenstein also gave rise
to doubt and fear:
69This and the next two quotations come from the letter from von Wright
to Wittgenstein, 31 July 1947, in Wittgenstein (2012, 370).
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The question may again be raised, whether for good or bad. I
have an awful feeling, I might as well have said conviction, that
nothing I consciously undertake for the sake of my soul can make
me substantially different from what I am, a pharisee in minutest
details, because I shall always lack courage to let myself down in
the abyss of despair which I know I had to pass in order to be
saved.
These words, which were written immediately after his second
stay at Cambridge, show that von Wright felt that any serious
engagement with the great philosopher may come at high per-
sonal cost. He must have regarded it a privilege to go for walks
and have philosophical talks with Wittgenstein, yet being un-
der the spell of such a powerful mind may have threatened von
Wright’s philosophical identity. This does not need to be a mat-
ter of rivalry with his much admired companion; it could rather
be that von Wright was concerned about whether he would be
able to free his mind again after having tuned into Wittgen-
stein’s way of thinking. Von Wright wrote about this concern
to his friend Göran Schildt:
When I came to Cambridge before the war, and to my surprise
found out that Wittgenstein was there it was self-evident that I
would approach him and come to receive his teaching. In two re-
spects this was of the greatest significance for me: partly because
Wittgenstein pulled me out of a dangerous philosophical jargon
which I had acquired under the impression of the general develop-
ment of logical empiricism in the 30s; partly, which I understood
only much later, I acquired a new philosophical jargon, which for
many years totally chained my thinking. (Fortunately almost all
my publications have been in a very narrow field in which I more
or less have been able to be myself.) Only during the two last
years I experienced that I have reached a certain independence,
found the beginning of a style of my own.
Then came the renewed and much deeper contact with Wittgen-
stein which among other things has given me a sense of signifi-
cant parts of his unpublished works. This time it could not be a
question of uncritical reception; it was rather a struggle of life and
death. I don’t say death lightly here, for god only knows, whether
after this I will ever be able to think a thought of my own.70
Despite the intensity of this inner conflict, von Wright once
again made an extraordinarily good impression on everyone
during his time in Cambridge. If a personal struggle was no-
ticeable at all in the conduct of the consummately composed
gentleman, it may have even added to the decency of his de-
meanor. Wittgenstein, in any case, obviously did not believe
von Wright’s philosophical sovereignty was in danger: dur-
ing one of their walks through Trinity’s Fellows Gardens, he
revealed his plans to resign from his chair and that he would
like von Wright to become his successor. Von Wright remem-
bered that moment as equally flattering and intimidating (von
Wright 2001, 129; 1989, 14). It was not unimportant that as von
Wright contemplated this proposition, he received encourage-
ment from several friends. Broad supported the idea that his
admired colleague and beloved friend would apply for the pro-
fessorship. Anscombe concurred, as she made clear in a letter
to von Wright after his return to Finland:
You will I expect by now have heard of Wittgenstein’s resignation
from the professorship at Cambridge. As I expect you know, he
has not done it for the reasons which he used to have for wonder-
ing whether he should not—the general beastliness of the situa-
tion at Cambridge and his feeling of incongruity about his being
in that job—but because he can’t get on with his book. In a few
weeks he is going to live near Dublin, so I suppose none of us will
see him for some time. He is in a rather depressed state at present,
but is not, he tells me, having any twinges of doubt about his res-
ignation, and I think that if when he gets away he is able to work
he is going to find it a great relief.
Meanwhile one feels very gloomy about things at Cambridge. I
suppose that sooner or later they will be advertising the profes-
sorship. Is there any remote chance of your applying for it? It isn’t
70Letter from von Wright to Schildt, 15 June 1947, in von Wright (2008).
Translation of the letter by Bernt Österman.
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of any significance that you are the only person I can think of in
that job without acute depression—but I’ve no doubt that others
whose opinion does count will have the same idea. But I have a
fear from certain things that you said about your job at Helsingfors
that loyalty may keep you there apart from anything else.71
By the time von Wright read this, he was undecided whether
he really ought to apply for the professorship. He was unsure
whether at the age of 31, he was suited for this most outstanding
position of professor of philosophy at Cambridge. In addition,
he hesitated to force his family to resettle in England. Wittgen-
stein expressed his sympathy for these doubts and would have
been neither surprised nor disappointed if von Wright had de-
cided to stay in Finland.72 The decisive consideration in favor
of applying was seemingly a political one: von Wright feared
that Finland might be incorporated into the Soviet Union. If this
happened, he would be isolated from his cherished colleagues
to the west and prevented from philosophical exchanges with
them.73 Thus, after intense deliberation, von Wright applied for
the professorship in January 1948. While Broad informed him of
the formal requirements for applying for the post, von Wright
asked Wittgenstein for a letter of recommendation. Wittgen-
stein agreed, but not without a word of warning:
Dear von Wright,
Miss Anscombe wrote to me a few weeks ago that you had put
in for the professorship. I shall write the recommendation in a
few days & send it to the Registrary as you suggest. May your
decision be the right one! I have no doubt that you will be a bet-
ter professor than any of the other candidates for the chair. But
Cambridge is a dangerous place. Will you become superficial?
71Letter from Anscombe to von Wright, 12 October 1947, NLF, Coll. 714.11–
12.
72Letter from Wittgenstein to von Wright, 22 December 1947, in Wittgen-
stein (2012, 378).
73von Wright (2001, 132); Letter from Wittgenstein to Malcolm, 30 April
1948, in Wittgenstein (2012, 385).
smooth? If you don’t, you will have to suffer terribly.—The pas-
sage in your letter which makes me feel particularly uneasy is the
one about your feeling enthusiasm at the thought of teaching in
Cambridge. It seems to me: if you go to Cambridge you must go
as a sober man.—May my fears have no foundation, & may you
not be tempted beyond your powers! 74
In contrast to Wittgenstein, Anscombe had no doubts about
von Wright’s prospects as professor. In a long letter, she ex-
pressed her delight about von Wright’s application and ad-
dressed many themes besides the new position, such as the Trac-
tatus, Parmenides, Leibniz and the current situation of English
academia. Anscombe may have wished for a friend in such an
influential position.75 First and foremost, however, her letter
shows that friendship and mutual professional respect had be-
gun to grow between herself and von Wright. Of course, their
relationship was rooted in their acquaintance with Wittgenstein
and his philosophy, but other strands grew out from this. De-
spite many shared philosophical interests, however, their mu-
tual literary recommendations remind one of how different they
must have been. In a letter to von Wright, she commented
on the already-mentioned three volumes of Werner Jaeger’s
Paideia, which von Wright had obviously recommended to her:
Werner Jaeger, I have got to confess, does not appeal to me; it may
be because I have not read a great deal of his book; I think it prob-
able that one should read a great continuous chunk of it in order
to get anything out of it; but I am afraid that I have got impatient
with the atmosphere of general adulation.76
Anscombe added her literary recommendation of her own in a
post-script:
74Letter from Wittgenstein to von Wright, 23 February 1948, in Wittgenstein
(2012, 381).
75I am especially thankful to Harald Johannessen for this suggestion.
76Letter from Anscombe to von Wright, May 1948, NLF, Coll. 714.11–12.
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Have you ever read a short (unfinished) story of Franz Kafka’s
called “The Burrow”? I did not understand it for a long time, but
now I do and I think it incomparably the most significant thing of
his, &77 one of the most significant things I have ever read. I’d like
to know what you think of it.
Compare these works by Jaeger and Kafka and the contrast
could hardly be more striking! Adding Wittgenstein’s read-
ing suggestions completes a peculiar literary triangle: after
Anscombe once lent Wittgenstein a work by Kafka, Wittgen-
stein is reported to have said that Kafka “gives himself a great
deal of trouble not writing about his trouble” (Monk 1991,
498). According to biographer Ray Monk, Wittgenstein recom-
mended that Anscombe instead read Otto Weininger’s The Four
Last Things and Sex and Character (Monk 1991, 498). Despite the
contrast between Wittgenstein’s and Anscombe’s reading lists,
it is doubtful whether Wittgenstein shared von Wright’s enthu-
siasm about Jaeger’s philological edifice. Wittgenstein encour-
aged him to read Wilhelm Busch.78 These differences in literary
taste may provide some hint of the characteristic dissimilarities
that persisted amongst these three thinkers in spite of all their
respectful friendship and philosophical resemblance.
There is a second post-script in Ancombe’s letter to von
Wright:
I delay a day or two even in posting this—and now I hear from
Cambridge that you are elected (from my husband, who asks me
to send you his good wishes & congratulation.)—I am extremely
glad.79
On 15 May 1948, von Wright received the official telegram of-
fering him the professorship. Two days later von Wright wrote
to Broad:
77Anscombe often uses an abbreviation for “and” which is here transcribed
as “&”.
78For an account of Wittgenstein and von Wright’s exchange on Wilhelm
Busch, see Erbacher and Österman (2014).
79Letter from Anscombe to von Wright, May 1948, NLF, Coll. 714.11–12.
Underlinings in the original letter are transcribed as italics.
I have to-day cabled to the Vice-Chancellor that I accept the in-
vitation to the professorship. I feel very much surprised, over-
whelmed and honoured. I shall do my best to become a good
professor, and I hope I shall not fail in my efforts.80
Gilbert Ryle, professor at Oxford and one of the electors, tele-
graphed to von Wright: “You will be respected for your work
and welcomed for yourself” (von Wright 2001, 133)—a mes-
sage that certainly encouraged von Wright to meet his new and
daunting task. After all, von Wright was only 32 years old
when he filled Wittgenstein’s shoes as professor of philosophy
at Cambridge.
Anscombe 2
By the time von Wright arrived at Cambridge to assume his pro-
fessorial duties, Wittgenstein had already moved to Ireland in
order to finish his book. After his last lecture, he visited Rhees
in Swansea and he had his latest remarks on the philosophy of
psychology typed. Wittgenstein took the resulting typescript to
Dublin in December 1947.81 He stayed at a farm in the south
of Dublin owned by a colleague of his friend Maurice Drury
who had recently been appointed psychiatrist at St. Patrick’s
Hospital. At first Wittgenstein’s work went well. Around Eas-
ter 1948, however, illness and depression stopped the auspi-
cious flow. Once more Wittgenstein began doubting whether
he would ever finish his book. Towards the end of April, he
secluded himself further by moving into a small cabin on the
west coast of Ireland. There his work improved, slowly at first,
but with increasing productivity as Summer approached. Ex-
cept for a visit from his friend Ben Richards and daily meetings
with his “assistant” Tommy, who had to burn pages of rejected
remarks, Wittgenstein spent the Summer living and working in
80Letter from von Wright to Broad, 17 May 1948, NLF, Coll. 714.28–32.
81Wittgenstein (2000b, Ts 229); later published in Wittgenstein (1980b).
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isolation (Monk 1991, 525–26). In the Autumn of 1948, Wittgen-
stein went to Vienna to visit his sister Hermine who was seri-
ously ill. On his way back to Ireland he stopped in Cambridge
where he had his recently revised remarks typed.82 While stay-
ing in Cambridge, he discussed the Philosophical Investigations
with Anscombe and lent her a typescript of the work.83
Wittgenstein had initially planned to spend the Winter of
1948–49 in his cabin at the Irish coast, but instead decided to
remain in Dublin and moved into the Ross Hotel. It was there
that he experienced a rush of creativity, as he wrote to Malcolm:
When I came here I found to my surprise that I could work again;
and as I am anxious to make hay during the very short period
when the sun shines in my brain I’ve decided not to go to Rosro
this winter but to stay here where I’ve got a warm and quiet
room.84
In a period of intense work lasting from October to December
1948, Wittgenstein completed a series of manuscripts on the
philosophy of psychology.85 During the first half of Decem-
ber, Anscombe came to visit. They discussed the new work and
Wittgenstein indicated to her that it should be incorporated into
his book.86 Around the same time, he wrote to Moore with a
view to make sure that his manuscripts should be given to his
executors.87 Shortly after Anscombe’s departure, in the second
82Wittgenstein (2000b, Ts 232); later published in Wittgenstein (1980c).
83Wittgenstein (2000b, Ts 227a); referred to as “Spätfassung” (late version)
in Wittgenstein (2001); Letter from Wittgenstein to Malcolm, 6 November
1948, in Wittgenstein (2012, 393).
84Letter from Wittgenstein to Malcolm, 6 November 1948, in Wittgenstein
(2012, 393).
85Wittgenstein (2000b, Ms 137), later published in Wittgenstein (1982a).
86This information was the reason to include “Part II” in Anscombe and
Rhees’ edition of the Philosophical Investigations (1953). The relevant quotes
can be found in Erbacher (2015).
87Letter from Wittgenstein to Moore, 16 December 1948, in Wittgenstein
(2012, 394).
half of December, Rhees visited Wittgenstein at the Ross Hotel.
The two discussed Wittgenstein’s new remarks and Rhees, like
Anscombe, was told that they should be incorporated into his
book.88 On New Years Eve, one day before Rhees left Dublin,
Wittgenstein informed Moore:
My executors are Rhees and Burnaby of Trinity.89
Wittgenstein stayed in the Ross Hotel for the first half of 1949,
with the exception of a visit to Vienna in April (Wittgenstein
2012, 396–407). He was ill for many weeks during Spring, but
eventually able to travel to Cambridge in late June. Here he had
typed his new remarks. The resulting typescript would later be
used for printing Part II of Rhees and Anscombe’s posthumous
edition of the Philosophical Investigations.90 During the typing
process, Wittgenstein and Anscombe had lunch together sev-
eral times, as she later told von Wright, “I remember his reading
it a bit and exclaiming at some point ‘Gescheit!’”91
While staying in Cambridge, Wittgenstein was the guest of
von Wright who rented a large house on Lady Margaret Road.
Here they sometimes enjoyed tea in the garden. Half jokingly,
Wittgenstein even offered to design a house that von Wright
was planning to build—a proposal that, to von Wright’s relief,
88See note 86.
89Letter from Wittgenstein to Moore, 31 December 1948, in Wittgenstein
(2012, 395). Rev. John Burnaby was an ordained priest, fellow of Trinity
College, Junior Bursar and, in 1948, Dean of Chapel and University lec-
turer in Divinity. Later he became Regius Professor of Divinity; see http:
//trinitycollegechapel.com/about/memorials/brasses/burnaby/. Ac-
cording to a note in a personal conversation with Michael Nedo, Burnaby
declined the proposal to become Wittgenstein’s executor.
90Typescript now lost; last existing pre-version (Wittgenstein 2000b, Ms
144) published in Wittgenstein (2001).
91Letter from Anscombe to von Wright, 15 April 1991, NLF, Coll. 714.11–
12. “Gescheit!” is an idiomatic expression in Austrian dialect; it is difficult to
translate, but helpful approximations may be “bright!”, “smart!”, “shrewd!”,
but also “well done!”.
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went unfulfilled. About their discussions during that period,
von Wright later gave a report:
When Wittgenstein was with us, he and I had daily talks, some-
times on things he was working on then, sometimes on the log-
ical topics which were mine at the time, but most often on liter-
ature and music, on religion, and on what could perhaps best be
termed the philosophy of history and civilization. Wittgenstein
sometimes read to me from his favourite authors, for example,
from Grimm’s Maerchen or Gottfried Keller’s Zuericher Novellen.
The recollection of his voice and facial expression when, seated
in a chair in his sickroom, he read aloud Goethe’s Hermann und
Dorothea is for me unforgettable. (von Wright 1989, 15)
His reading was full of expression and precision, without any the-
atricality. (von Wright 2001, 129; my translation)
Von Wright felt that his mutual sympathy with Wittgenstein
was rooted in these shared non-philosophical interests, in their
shared taste in art and their common background of cen-
tral European culture (von Wright 2001, 74). Discussions be-
tween Anscombe and Wittgenstein, by contrast, seem to have
been more directly focused on philosophy. Once she noted to
von Wright that she considered it “a very striking fact about
Wittgenstein’s thought that he reverts to problems of Greek phi-
losophy”.92 She continued:
. . . one of the things for which I am grateful to him is that he has
caused me to read Plato and Parmenides with more understand-
ing.93
In fact, Anscombe was working on an essay in which she used
the means she had learned from Wittgenstein to treat a philo-
sophical problem the first expression of which she had found in
Parmenides: the question of whether we must regard the con-
cept of the past as a delusion, since there is no state of affairs
92Letter from Anscombe to von Wright, May 1948, NLF, Coll. 714.11–12.
93Letter from Anscombe to von Wright, May 1948, NLF, Coll. 714.11–12.
to which statements about the past can point. In this formula-
tion, the problem of our knowledge of past time is the question
how statements about the past can have meaning. In her essay
entitled “The Reality of the Past” (1950), Anscombe presented
the inclination to construct a theory of knowledge about past
events as a foundation for how statements about the past can
be true. This led her to take into consideration possible theories
of memory and consciousness. By introducing intriguing sce-
narios of how we actually do and possibly can meaningfully
speak about the past, she delicately and carefully sorted out
misleading analogies in our striving for such general theoretical
accounts. Working through the problem piecemeal, Anscombe
identified the source of her philosophical perplexity:
The idea of the past as something there, to which true statements
about the past correspond as a description corresponds to the ob-
ject that we can compare with it, is what produces the puzzlement
of which this paper is a discussion; for now when I wish, as it
were, to locate this object I cannot do so. (Anscombe 1950, 113)
Anscombe would not come up with a coherent theory that
would justify our way of speaking about the past, yet her sce-
narios from everyday life showed that we do understand the
examples of talking about the past. How then can statements
about the past have meaning? Echoing von Wright’s conclu-
sion in his early talk to the Moral Sciences Club in Spring 1939,
Anscombe tunes into a philosophical dissolution by refusing to
provide a theory and, instead, treating the demand for a the-
ory: “The purpose of answering the question ‘How does the
past tense have meaning?’ by giving a description of use is to
make one think that this search for a justification is a mistake”
(Anscombe 1950, 118).
Anscombe was very clear about the fact that she owed to
Wittgenstein the course of her discussion in “The Reality of the
Past.” She ends her essay thus:
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And so far I can judge, only the account of meaning given by
Wittgenstein enables one without begging the question to intro-
duce mention of actual past events into one’s account of knowing
the past that one has witnessed. This is made possible precisely
by that feature of his method which is most difficult to accept:
namely, that he attacks the effort at justification. (Anscombe 1950,
118)
Anscombe had been working on “The Reality of the Past”
since 1948,94 and it was published in a volume of essays by sev-
eral of Wittgenstein’s students in 1950. Thus, it is likely that
Anscombe has shown it to Wittgenstein before publication. If
so, it is telling since “The Reality of the Past” can really be
read as an application of Wittgenstein’s thought and method.
Anscombe was aware of this and made it patently clear in a
footnote:
Everywhere in this paper I have imitated his ideas and methods
of discussion. The best I have written is a weak copy of some
features of the original, and its value depends only on my capacity
to understand and use Dr Wittgenstein’s work. (Anscombe 1950,
50)
This footnote is interesting in light of how furious Wittgen-
stein was with earlier attempts to paraphrase his ideas: against
this background, it is informative that he did not intervene
in Anscombe’s article.95 Indeed, Anscombe’s essay seems to
differ in one crucial aspect from other authors’ publications
that Wittgenstein had condemned: whereas earlier writers
may have claimed to present original thinking while imitating
Wittgenstein, Anscombe admitted imitation while presenting
94Anscombe mentioned this in her letter to von Wright, May 1948, NLF,
Coll. 714.11–12.
95I am especially indebted to James Conant for making me see the relevance
of Anscombe’s essay “Reality of the Past” in the context of the question how
it came that Anscombe was asked to translate the Philosophical Investigations.
original thinking.96 “The Reality of the Past” does not mimic
Wittgenstein’s style nor does it lightheartedly repeat his slo-
gans. Anscombe makes effective use of Wittgenstein’s method
in order to clarify her genuine philosophical puzzlement. Un-
like Wittgenstein, she follows a clear argumentative structure
that proceeds from one step to the next in order to untie the in-
tellectual knot. Like Wittgenstein, however, she uses a language
that is simple, strong and so dense that it requires slow read-
ing. If Wittgenstein saw the article, he certainly noticed these
stylistic qualities and this might have further contributed to the
idea that Anscombe could be the right person for translating the
Philosophical Investigations. He knew her capability to render his
words into English from earlier experiments, as this recollection
by Anscombe shows:
96I owe an anonymous reviewer for JHAP the following suggestion that is
worth quoting here:
Another case backs up this general line of thinking. For John Wisdom pub-
lished a paper entitled ‘Philosophical Perplexity’ in the 1936/7 Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society, and Wittgenstein did not complain. In it Wis-
dom wrote an acknowledgement very similar to Anscombe’s (in his first
footnote): “Wittgenstein has not read this over-compressed paper and I
warn people against supposing it a closer imitation of Wittgenstein than it
is. On the other hand I can hardly exaggerate the debt I owe to him and
how much of the good in this work is his—not only in the treatment of
this philosophical difficulty and that but in the matter of how to do phi-
losophy. As far as possible I have put a W against examples I owe to him.
It must not be assumed that they are used in a way he would approve.”
It seems to me that both Wisdom’s and Anscombe’s acknowledgements
make two points that were jointly necessary for Wittgenstein not to get
angry: (i) they make a full-throated acknowledgement that many of the
ideas in the work are taken directly from or derived from Wittgenstein;
and (ii) they equally acknowledge that in the transfer process they may
have distorted them from Wittgenstein’s original intention. Wittgenstein’s
annoyance with Waismann seems to have derived from the lack of (i) in
his paper; and his annoyance with Braithwaite seems to have derived from
lack of (ii).
See Wisdom (1937).
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In 1946 I decided to learn German, and started with Hugo. I told
Wittgenstein, and he said ‘Oh, I am very glad, for if you learn Ger-
man, then I can give you my book to read’. This had been my
hope, and it spurred me on. We read the introduction to Frege’s
Grundlagen together. He professed amazed admiration at my lay-
ing hold of the construction of the sentences. He said, what no
doubt was true, that it must have been the fruit of a training in
Latin. But I was struck by the incongruousness of his admiring
the exercise of so elementary a skill, which I thought a very slight
display of intelligence, when one could get into fearful trouble in
his lectures for not grasping something which I was sure it needed
great powers and hard thought to grasp. We eventually read the
early part of the Investigations; I remember he reacted with real
pleasure when I told him that I had read to §35 and had found
it intoxicating; which was the case. As we read it we discussed
translating it—he would explain the import of words, and I would
suggest an English rendering, about which he would be very en-
thusiastic. (I don’t know if I remembered any of these when I came
to translate the book for its publication in 1953.)97
At the latest in early 1950, Anscombe had “committed herself to
translating the Investigations and wanted to equip herself for the
task with a good knowledge of Viennese German” (Geach 1988,
xiii). For this purpose, Wittgenstein arranged for her to spend
several months in Vienna in Spring 1950.98 At least during a
part of this visit she stayed in the house of Wittgenstein’s friend
Ludwig Hänsel.99
97Transcript from Anscombe’s notebook. I thank Prof. Luke Gormally for
sending this transcript to me and Dr. Mary Geach for permitting to quote it.
Prof. Gormally added the following note: “Hugo refers to a series of elemen-
tary language learning texts, including German.”
98Notes from personal conversation with Ingrid Hänsel and with Dr. Mary
Geach. According to both, Anscombe was sent to Vienna by Wittgenstein.
Later, Prof. Luke Gormally specified in a note to the author that Wittgenstein
“arranged for her to spend nine months in Vienna in 1950 so that she could
perfect her knowledge of Austrian German.”
99Notes from personal conversation with Ingrid Hänsel. According to I.
Hänsel, Anscombe lived at the house of Wittgenstein’s friend Ludwig Hänsel.
Wittgenstein too was in Vienna in early 1950, principally to
visit his sister Hermine for the last time. He had then returned
from visiting Malcolm in Ithaca, New York. Already during
this journey, he had appeared weakened himself, and after re-
turning to England in November 1949, he had been diagnosed
with cancer. In Vienna in early 1950, Anscombe and Wittgen-
stein met for discussions two to three times a week.100 Once
they attended a meeting of the philosophical circle around Vik-
tor Kraft, a member of the former Vienna Circle who was just
finishing a summarizing book on this philosophical movement
(Kraft 1950). Being a student of Kraft, Paul Feyerabend was
also present at that meeting. As a result of the discussion, Fey-
erabend wished to write a doctoral dissertation under Wittgen-
stein’s supervision—a wish that the course of Wittgenstein’s life
left unfulfilled.
By April 1950, Wittgenstein and Anscombe had returned to
England and Wittgenstein moved into Anscombe’s house in
Oxford. They most likely discussed the translation of his book.
Given his keen interest in earlier translations of his work, it is
hard to imagine that he would have lived in the same house
with his translator and not paid due attention to the process un-
derway. In fact, Jenny Teichman, a friend of Anscombe’s fam-
ily, wrote that the translation “was carried out under his guid-
ance” (Teichmann 2001, 2). According to Peter Geach, the trans-
lation of all remarks in the then-current version of the Philosoph-
ical Investigations was finished while Wittgenstein was still alive
(Geach 1988, xiii).
During the Summer of 1950, Wittgenstein waited for his
friend Ben Richards to finish an exam so that they could travel
together to Skjolden. Wittgenstein used the time to write about
questions of knowledge and certainty, themes he had discussed
See Somavilla et al. (1994).
100Letter from Wittgenstein to von Wright, 12 February 1950, in Wittgenstein
(2012, 419).
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with Malcolm in the United States. These new remarks, how-
ever, were not meant to go into his book.101 His work on the
Philosophical Investigations had, it seems, come to an end. In the
Autumn of 1950, Wittgenstein and Richards finally took their
journey to Skjolden, to the spot at the end of the Sognefjord
where the philosopher had experienced an intellectual rush as
a youth and achieved another breakthrough in his later work as
a man in his prime. Now he was inspired once again. Despite
illness, Wittgenstein even planned to return to Skjolden to re-
sume his philosophical work. This he wrote in a letter to von
Wright:
If all goes well I shall sail on Dec. 30th and go to Skjolden again.
. . . I don’t think I’ll be able to stay in my hut because the physical
work I’ve got to do there is too heavy for me, but an old friend
told me that she’d let me stay at her farmhouse. Of course I don’t
know whether I’m able any more to do decent work, but at least
I’m giving myself a real chance. If I can’t work there I can’t work
anywhere.102
Despite this flare of hope, Wittgenstein’s health now dete-
riorated rapidly and he was unfit for the ship’s departure.
Anscombe informed von Wright on New Year’s Day 1951:
He is still in England, as he wasn’t able to make arrangements in
Norway. Also he has been rather ill, but apparently it is—or ought
to be—a temporary thing and to pass off in another week or two.
He already seems much better after having been pretty wretched
and having a good deal of pain ever since his return in November.
Of course he has not been able to do any work and he told me that
he had not even felt any frustration at this, but was vegetating.
He spent Christmas here at the Bevans’ house and has returned to
Oxford today—or so I believe; this was his plan last night.103
101Wittgenstein (2000b, Mss 169–176); later partly published in Wittgenstein
(1969a), Wittgenstein (1977), Wittgenstein (1982a), and Wittgenstein (1992).
102Letter from Wittgenstein to von Wright, 7 December 1950, in Wittgenstein
(2012, 430).
103Letter from Anscombe to von Wright, 1 January 1951, NLF, Coll. 714.11–
12.
Wittgenstein suffered severe attacks of pain in the subsequent
weeks.104 Returning to Oxford from yet another treatment ses-
sion in Cambridge on 29 January 1951, he gathered witnesses to
sign his will by which he entrusted Rhees, Anscombe and von
Wright with the task to decide what to publish from his writ-
ings:
I GIVE to MR. R. Rhees Miss Anscombe and Professor G. H. v.
Wright of Trinity College Cambridge All the copyright in all my
unpublished writings and also the manuscripts and typescripts
thereof to dispose of as they think best but subject to any claim by
anybody else to the custody of the manuscripts and typescripts
I intend and desire that Mr. Rhees Miss Anscombe and Professor
von Wright shall publish as many of my unpublished writings as
they think fit but I do not wish them to incur expenses in publica-
tion which they do not expect to recoup out of royalties or other
profits105
In February 1951, treatments were stopped and Wittgenstein
moved into the house of his medical doctor Edward V. Bevan in
Cambridge. Von Wright visited him there several times, and
Wittgenstein once came to see von Wright in his college of-
fice. They talked about Sergej Aksakov’s “Family Chronicle”
but not about questions related to editing his papers. In fact,
Wittgenstein did not tell von Wright that he was to inherit this
task (von Wright 2001, 152, 158). With Rhees, on the other
hand, he directly addressed the issue. As late as ten days be-
fore his death, Wittgenstein spoke with Rhees about preparing
the manuscripts for publication. According to Rhees, Wittgen-
stein “was particularly anxious that care should be taken in
what was published and how it was presented”.106 However,
when Anscombe asked Wittgenstein how they ought to deal
104Letter from Anscombe to Wittgenstein’s sister, 8 June 1951, transcription
by Kotte Autographs GmbH, Germany.
105Wittgenstein’s will, 29 January 1951, copy at WWA.
106Letter from Rhees to von Wright, 7 July 1965, WWA.
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with variant versions in his manuscripts, Wittgenstein is said to
have answered that he could not help them any longer (Nedo
1993, 75). He left these decisions to the literary heirs he had
chosen. In one of their last conversations about the matter and
a few days before his death, Wittgenstein said to Rhees: “I trust
you absolutely, and I trust Miss Anscombe absolutely.”107
Concluding Remarks108
Wittgenstein died in April 1951. The fact that he passed the
copyright for his unpublished writings on to Rhees, Anscombe
and von Wright may seem like the final acknowledgement that
he would not live to see his book printed. This thought, how-
ever, was already familiar to him. Finishing the Tractatus during
World War I, he had been compelled to consider what should
happen to his work if he died. This is why the very first entry
in the first of his preserved philosophical notebooks states that
“After my death to be sent to Mrs. Poldy Wittgenstein XVII.
Neuwaldeggerstr. 38—to be sent to Hon. B. Russell Trinity Col-
lege Cambridge.”109 In June 1917, at the age of 28, Wittgenstein
wrote what may be considered his first more extensive will.110
This concern for the posthumous fate of his writings was not ex-
clusively caused by the life-threatening conditions of war. Since
107Letter from Rhees to Kenny, 22 March 1977, copy at WWA. Underlinings
in the original letter are transcribed as italics. An edited version of this letter
has been published in Rhees (1996).
108I thank an anonymous reviewer for JHAP for suggesting this concluding
section.
109Wittgenstein (2000b, Ms 101, iii), entry from 9 August 1914. The Ger-
man original reads: “Nach meinem Tod zu senden an Frau Poldy Wittgen-
stein XVII. Neuwaldeggerstr. 38 Zu senden an Hon. B. Russell Trinity College
Cambridge”; my translation.
110The critical edition of the Tractatus informs about a letter (dated 7 June
1917) that contains instructions for what should be done with Wittgenstein’s
manuscripts after his death; this letter may be regarded as the first will
Wittgenstein wrote. See Wittgenstein (1989, XIV).
resuming philosophical writing in 1929, shortly after his return
to Cambridge, he told Frank R. Leavis that “When I am engaged
on a piece of work I’m always afraid I shall die before I’ve fin-
ished it. So I make a fair copy of the day’s work, and give it to
Frank Ramsey for safe-keeping” (Rhees 1984, 61).
This practice was later repeated in different forms and found
its final expression in the will Wittgenstein signed in 1951, nam-
ing Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright as his literary execu-
tors. Thus it may be safely assumed that Wittgenstein did not
make this choice in haste. Indeed, the presentation in this essay
has aimed at showing how personal and philosophical friend-
ships grew over many years and eventually led Wittgenstein
to choose his three literary executors. At this point it may be
worthwhile explicating some further suggestions for why he
chose them, though much of this must naturally remain spec-
ulation.
The entire foregoing story indicates that Wittgenstein was
convinced of Rhees’, Anscombe’s and von Wright’s philosoph-
ical acumen and integrity. He had advised some of his most
trusted and loyal friends to leave philosophy and pursue other
more suitable occupations. This was not the case with Rhees,
Anscombe or von Wright. Wittgenstein actually helped to es-
tablish their academic positions by writing recommendations
for each of them. Two of these recommendations still exist and
have been quoted above; the third one concerning von Wright
has not yet been found, but there is a letter by Wittgenstein
which confirms that he indeed wrote such a letter (also quoted
above); Wittgenstein concludes it by saying “If I wanted to play
providence I’d write you a lukewarm recommendation; but I
won’t. I’ll write you as good a one as you can possibly wish for.
For what can I know about the future?”111
111Letter from Wittgenstein to von Wright, 2 February 1948, in Wittgenstein
(2012, 381).
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Besides trusting their overall philosophical talent, Wittgen-
stein extensively discussed his work with Rhees, Anscombe
and von Wright; hence he was aware of their understanding
of his philosophy. This is also true for von Wright, even if he
felt his friendship with Wittgenstein was based on similarities
in taste and culture rather than on philosophical resemblance.
This, however, points to another important aspect: none of the
three were inclined or tempted to imitate Wittgenstein by using
his methods or expressions in their own names. Judging from
Wittgenstein’s loathing of plagiarism, he certainly valued this
intellectual independence.
A similar account may to some extent be given for other
trusted friends whose philosophical talent Wittgenstein appre-
ciated. But in contrast to them, Rhees, Anscombe and von
Wright may have possessed further qualities especially rele-
vant for the practical task of publishing his papers. Two as-
pects immediately come to mind: first, all three had a very good
command of German—the language Wittgenstein almost exclu-
sively wrote. Rhees spent long periods in Austria when study-
ing with Kastil, Anscombe became acquainted with Austrian
German when preparing herself to translate the Philosophical In-
vestigations and von Wright was educated in a mainly German-
speaking academic environment. Second, all three lived in
Great Britain at the time of Wittgenstein’s death: Rhees was a
lecturer in Swansea, Anscombe was a research fellow at Ox-
ford and von Wright had succeeded him as professor of philos-
ophy at Cambridge. In addition to these qualities that apply to
all three, other more specific qualities may have further distin-
guished them from other candidates. A consideration of these
specific qualities may best be made in a way that follows the
order in which the literary executors appear in Wittgenstein’s
will. This order may also reflect the temporal order of Wittgen-
stein’s decisions to include each of them.
Rhees was the first to be chosen for the task: in a letter to
Moore he was named executor as early as 1948. Since Rhees
was visiting Wittgenstein when this letter was written, it may
be assumed that he had been asked and had agreed. At that
time, Wittgenstein had known Rhees for 15 years. Rhees had
started attending Wittgenstein’s lectures albeit with some hesi-
tation, but became a regular attendee in the subsequent years.
Through discussions outside class and on repeated visits, he
gained insight into the development of Wittgenstein’s book,
witnessed his way of working and was aware of his considera-
tions as he composed his remarks with a view towards publica-
tion. Rhees was sympathetic to Wittgenstein’s second thoughts
about authorship and customs of academia. Thus, Rhees shared
Wittgenstein’s views in many crucial respects, and Wittgenstein
could be certain that Rhees would be loyal to these views. This
combination of philosophical understanding and unconditional
loyalty may have contributed to Wittgenstein choosing him as
an executor, not only in 1948, but also in the final will from 1951:
I appoint my friend MR. R. RHEES of 96 Bryn Road Swansea to be
the EXECUTOR of this my will and I hope that he will accept £50 for
his personal Expenses in discharging this Trust112
In 1948, Wittgenstein envisaged both Rhees and Rev. John
Burnaby to be his executors. When Burnaby declined, it might
have been possible to leave the task to Rhees alone. In a sense
this is what happened, as Rhees became the sole executor of
Wittgenstein’s will in 1951. However, the fact that Wittgen-
stein thought about entrusting the task to two men may indicate
that he considered it too much of a burden for only one person.
Thus, the idea of appointing a consortium of literary executors
may have occurred after Burnaby declined. Since Wittgenstein
had early on planned a bilingual edition of his book, Anscombe
was a natural candidate. Rhees’ unsuccessful attempt to trans-
late the early version of the Philosophical Investigations in 1938
112Wittgenstein’s will §2, copy at WWA. The sentence in italics represents an
addition in Wittgenstein’s hand; my transcription.
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ruled him out as a translator. Anscombe, on the other hand,
had been chosen and instructed by Wittgenstein to translate the
most finished version of his book at least one year before his
death. However, if Wittgenstein had wanted her to deal exclu-
sively with the translation and not with judgments about what
to publish, he would have had many opportunities to express
this wish. But there is nothing to indicate that he wanted to re-
strict Anscombe’s role to translating his writings. He may have
thought that she would have a special sensibility for a different
aspect of his philosophy than would Rhees. The same may be
true for von Wright.113 At any rate, Anscombe’s recollections of
her visit to Dublin in 1948 show that Wittgenstein informed not
only Rhees but also Anscombe about his plans for how to im-
prove his book. As this was precisely the time when he decided
that Rhees ought to become his executor, he may already then
have thought of integrating Anscombe into the task of publish-
ing his writings.
Wittgenstein informed Rhees and Anscombe about the task
he wanted them to do. In this respect, there is a clear differ-
ence between their appointment as literary executors and that
of von Wright, who may have been the last to be included in
the consortium.114 It is striking that Wittgenstein did not even
tell von Wright about his will. Why not? Did he not consider
it necessary? Did he fear that von Wright would not accept?
Or did he want to keep the option open of removing him from
the list? The answers to these questions will probably never be
known. However, it is thought-provoking in this context that
113Anthony Kenny has suggested that each of the literary executors covered
one aspect of Wittgenstein’s philosophy: von Wright the logical, Anscombe
the philosophy of mind and Rhees the mystical. Quoted from notes of a per-
sonal conversation; see also Kenny (2014). In this connection, it is worth not-
ing that von Wright was early on aware of the cultural context and literary
quality of Wittgenstein’s writings: see von Wright (1955).
114That von Wright was included last in the list of literary executors was also
assumed by M. Nedo in a personal conversation.
Rhees remembered Wittgenstein saying he would absolutely
trust Rhees and Anscombe, bearing in mind that this statement
was made when Wittgenstein had already signed the version
of his will that included von Wright as the third literary execu-
tor. The statement cannot possibly mean that Wittgenstein did
not trust von Wright in general. This would not only be absurd
given their relationship; had he not trusted von Wright, there
would have been no reason to include him in the first place.
It seems obvious that von Wright was just as loyal and trust-
worthy as the other two. Nevertheless, one may be inclined to
understand the statement as a hint concerning the future deci-
sions about which parts of his writings ought to be published.
Indeed, Rhees seems to have understood the statement in this
sense:
And he might have said of someone that he ‘did not altogether
trust him’, or perhaps of someone that he did not trust him at all:
meaning, of course, that he trusted, or did not trust the person’s
judgment in deciding what should be published. For it was plain
that he expected or took it as obvious that there would have to be
selection, and so there would have to be decisions.115
The fact that von Wright did not participate in preparing the
typescript for Anscombe and Rhees’ edition of the Philosophical
Investigations may be regarded as support for such an interpre-
tation (see Erbacher and Krebs 2015). On the other hand, again,
Wittgenstein did not, in his will, distinguish between the fu-
ture roles of his literary executors. All three are included in the
“they” of “what they think fit”. The only documentation hint-
ing that Wittgenstein might have been making a distinction be-
tween the three literary heirs is Rhees’ double position as execu-
tor of the will and literary executor, as well as the order in which
the literary executors are named. This order can be explained
neither by alphabet nor by age or gender. However, this seems
115Letter from Rhees to Kenny, 22 March 1977, copy at WWA. See also Rhees
(2006, 56).
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too weak to justify the strong interpretation of Wittgenstein’s
statement according to which he would not have trusted von
Wright’s judgment in making selections for publication. Von
Wright may have considered it inappropriate to intervene in
the editing of the Philosophical Investigations since—contrary to
Rhees and Anscombe—he had not been expressly asked to do
so, and neither may Rhees and Anscombe have asked him to
participate in it. However, his exclusion may also be explained
by the fact that he retired from his professorship and moved to
Finland while the editing took place (von Wright 2001, 152–57).
Furthermore, there could be many reasons for not mentioning
von Wright in Wittgenstein’s statement about trustworthiness.
It simply may have been inappropriate to mention to Rhees that
von Wright was meant to become one of the literary executors
before having informed von Wright himself. But then we are
left again with the question that triggered this line of thought:
why did Wittgenstein not inform von Wright?
A positive reason why Wittgenstein included von Wright as
a literary executor may be seen when considering once more
the letter from 1948 that names Rhees and Burnaby as his ex-
ecutors. Placing “Burnaby of Trinity” at Rhees’ side indicates
that Wittgenstein wanted to ensure a strong connection to Trin-
ity College. Despite all his reservations about academic cus-
toms at Cambridge, Trinity College had provided an academic
home for Wittgenstein for many years—for his discussions, lec-
tures and writing. As his successor as professor of philosophy,
von Wright certainly provided this connection to Trinity Col-
lege. Further, as the first months of the posthumous editing
show, it was advantageous that von Wright had an academi-
cally authoritative position: he played a central role in orga-
nizing the publication, in clarifying questions of copyright with
publishers and college representatives and in acquiring fund-
ing that would facilitate working on the manuscripts (Erbacher
and Krebs 2015). This function of von Wright may also give an
idea of the special abilities he brought to the team: von Wright
was an efficient manager who achieved the academic goals he
set for himself and he was able to take fastidious care of all the
practical necessities a decent publication would require. In ad-
dition, von Wright was a natural gentleman and diplomat. It
may have occurred to Wittgenstein that von Wright could act
as a mediator in cases of conflict between the other two rather
uncompromising characters—one a devout Catholic, the other
a strong-headed anarchist. Thus, naming von Wright as one of
his literary executors significantly reduced the risk of disagree-
ment within the group while increasing the likelihood that the
endeavor of publishing his book would soon be successfully
concluded.
Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright appear as a carefully cho-
sen and balanced triumvirate of literary executors. Considering
their personal integrity, philosophical ability and pragmatic ca-
pacities, it is comprehensible that Wittgenstein chose precisely
these three for publishing his writings. Furthermore, he ob-
viously felt that he could entrust them with this burden, and
he knew from Rhees and Anscombe that they would accept.
When appointing them, he may have thought first and fore-
most of publishing the Philosophical Investigations. This was the
book that he had prepared for publication to the greatest extent.
The literary executors knew this and were sure that publishing
the Philosophical Investigations was their first task (Erbacher and
Krebs 2015). However, in his will Wittgenstein referred to the
entirety of his writings, and for Rhees at least, it was obvious
that they should continue publishing selected material after the
Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein may have foreseen that
they would spare no trouble in fulfilling this wish. Perhaps this
is why he, in his will, reminded them not to “incur expenses in
publication which they do not expect to recoup”116. However,
116Wittgenstein’s will; this statement reminds us also of Wittgenstein’s un-
willingness to pay for the paper and the printing of the Tractatus in 1919; see
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at that point of time, no one envisaged that Wittgenstein’s last
will would give rise to an editorial story that, as of today, has
been expanding for 65 years.117
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